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INTRODUCTION 
The Official Information Act 1982 ("the Act") came into force on 
l July, 1983. 1 One aspect of the Act which appears likely to 
have a considerable impact on Administrative Law is the functions 
and duties which are reposed in cabinet Ministers and the 
Ombudsmen. My concern in this paper is not primarily with the 
substantive rules on the release of Official Information, 
al though these are highly relevant to any consideration of the 
roles of Ministers and the Ombudsman and some discussion of 
substantive rules is included in this paper where appropriate. 
My first concern is, however, process and procedure - more 
specifically with the role of two of the principal actors in the 
Official Information Act scenario: the Ombudsman and the 
Minister. Other actors, the officials and the courts, come on 
stage from time to time, but the spotlight remains principally on 
the Minister and the Ombudsman. 
Prima facie the respective functions of the Minister and the 
Ombudsman are clearly set out in the Act: first the Department or 
Minister (or one of the other agencies mentioned in the Act) 
receiving a request has the duty to decide what is to be released 
under the Act; 2 second, if a complaint is made, t he Ombudsman 
may review a decision of the Department or Minister ;3 third, 
the Minister concerned may "veto'' the Omsbudsman's recommendation 
within 21 days. 4 
It can thus be seen that the Minister may i n some ca.ses become 
involved in stages one and three. In such a case a Minister may 
be said to be an "interested" party before he comes to exercise 
his "veto" power. The veto power of the Minister is one aspect 
of the Act which has also been criticised on political grounds. 
It appears likely that the Act will be amended to remove or 
replace this power - this is t he policy of the new Labour 
Government. This paper is concerned primarily with the functions 
and duties of the Ombudsman and Minister as they have developed 
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so far. rbwever, this examination of the position to date will 
help predict the likely results of probable amendments, and some 
consideration will be given to these later. 
1.4 The functions of the Ombudsman5 give rise to less difficulty. 
1.5 
Pr! interesting development resulting from the Act is that the 
Ombudsman appears to be involved under the Act in making 
decisions which have a more judicial appearance - questions of 
law and reference to decided legal cases have come into greater 
prominence. There has also been some criticism6 that the Act 
brings the Ombudsman more often into conflict with Ministers and 
that, if great care is not taken, there is a danger of politici-
sing the Ombudsman's office. 
To examine more closely the role of the Ombudsman and the 
Minister, I propose to begin by looking at three areas in which 
dispute has arisen and to look at some of the cases that have 
come before the Ombudsmen (and in most cases the Minister) in 
these areas. The first area concerns cases where the Minister 
has become involved in stage one referred to above either because 
he has been consulted by the Department before deciding whether 
to release or because he has directed the Department not to 
release. In considering whether this is correct in terms of the 
Act, some interesting issues arise concerning the role of the 
Minister both under the Act and in general constitutional 
practice. 
privilege. 
The second group of cases concerns legal professional 
These cases illustrate the functions of the Ombudsman 
and this form of "privilege" is a subject on which the Courts 
have built up a considerable body of precedent. The third group 
of cases concerns the interpretation of the Act. These again 
highlight the Ombudsman's role since interpretation of a statute 
is another matter with which the courts are normally closely 
concerned. 
Having looked at some speci fie examples of how the Minister and 
the Ombudsman exercise their functions under the Act, I then wish 
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to consider the roles of these two principal actors in detail. 
First there are matters of relevance to both Minister and 
Ombudsman, such as the common criteria applied under the Act and 
the extent to which motives for requesting information can be 
ignored when considering requests under the Act. Then there are 
matters pertaining to the Minister solely - the veto powers, and 
the political responsibilities. Similarly there are matters 
pertaining principally to the Ombudsman - the change in his role 
under the Act and the comparison with his role under the 
Ombudsmen Act. Finally, after considering the relationship of 
these two principal actors with the courts, I wish to consider 
the effect of probable amendments to the Act in the future. 
1. 6 This paper, therefore, deals principally with the way in which 
the roles of Ombudsman and Minister have developed so far under 
the Act. These give rise, among other things, to matters of 
constitutional relevance, such as the relationship between the 
Minister and the Department. I propose to consider first the 
specific examples and then move on to more general consideration. 
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2. THE MINISTER ANO THE DEPARTMENT 
2.1 This Section 2 looks at a group of three cases which bring into 
focus a specific aspect of the role of the Minister. These cases 
also illustrate some points about the role of the Ombudsman which 
I wish to consider later on in this paper. These cases concern 
the situation which arises when the Department, having formed a 
tentative view that it should release the information as 
requested, then consults the Minister who advises he opposes 
release. These cases raise important conceptual issues under the 
Act, namely the extent to which the Department should be divorced 
from its Minister in making decisions under the Act. In this 
context reference is made to constitutional questions and the 
relationship between a department and its Minister. From this a 
number of possible solutions can be posited. Ultimately, it 
appears that there has been a constitutional shift in the 
relationship of the Minister to his department. In practice a 
modern department of state can, and at times does, act indepen-
dently and not just as the alter ego of the Minister. This does 
not mean however that in every case it is possible or practicable 
to divorce the Minister from his department when requests under 
the Act are being considered by the department. 
2.2 
2.2.1 
School Computers case 
The respective roles of Minister and Department are brought into 
sharp relief in the reported instances where the Department, 
having formed a tentative view that it should release the 
information as requested, then consults the Minister who advises 
that he opposes release. The best known of these cases is the 
"Computers for Schools" case. 7 The case involved a request for 
two sets of documents. The request was denied as regards both 
sets and the requestor asked the Ombudsman to investigate. The 
first set of documents requested was a draft Cabinet paper. The 
Ombudsman was able to resolve this matter under Section 13 of the 
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Act ( "reasonable assistance" to enquirer). 
accepted this. 
The Department 
2.2.2 The second set of documents requested, was a report from the 
State Services Commission and the Department of Education 
advising (among other things) which computers would be most 
suitable in Secondary Schools. The principal reason advanced for 
not releasing this was that the information contained in the 
report included information provided by the various competing 
computer companies. These companies, it was said, expected the 
information to be kept confidential. Section 9(2)(b) of the Act 
was invoked in this regard. The Ombudsman rejected this 
argument. First of all, Section 9(2)(b) requires the information 
to be "supplied in confidence118 not just treated as confiden-
tial by the Department. Secondly the Ombudsman said: "Indeed, 
in a submission to the Minister, the Department had expressed 
doubt that publication would prejudice the supply of similar 
information in the future because the companies concerned, for 
commercial reasons, would always be anxious to supply information 
on their product. ?119 
2.2.3 The important point however is that the Department had consulted 
the Minister and changed its decision as a result. The Ombudsman 
commented: 10 
"My investigation disclosed that when initially 
considering whether to release the report, the 
Department had expressed the view to the Minister of 
Education that the spirit of the Official Informa-
tion Act required the release of the evaluation 
report. The Minister, however, had ordered that the 
report not be released. In my report to the 
Director-General, I pointed out that where - having 
been asked to investigate and review a refusal to 
supply information - I found that either no reason 
had been given for a decision to withhold informa-
tion, or that the reasons given were not good 
reasons in terms of the Act, and where I had 
accordingly proceeded to recommend that the 
informat10n be made available, Section 32 afforded 
the Minister an opportunity at that point to direct 
the Department not to observe my recommendation. 
--
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While I was not suggesting that consultation with 
the Minister at an earlier stage was in any sense 
inappropriate, the purpose of my observation was to 
underline my belief that the approach I had outlined 
was the one contemplated by the Legislature." 
I think emphasis should be given to the second sentence of this 
extract: the Minister "ordered" the Department not to release 
the information sought. Presumably the request was initially 
made to the Department, not the Minister, and presumably the 
information was held by the Department. Section 15 of the Act 
clearly requires the Department in such circumstances to decide 
whether or not to release. Has the Minister the right to order 
otherwise? 
2. 2. 4 The second interesting aspect of this case is that, after the 
Ombudsman had recommended release of the report, the Minister 
exercised his "veto" under the Act. The ground relied on was 
stated simply as "the competitive commercial activities of those 
companies who supplied information to the Department" . 11 This 
is a clear reference to Section 8(1) of the Act although it is 
unclear whether he relied on sub-clauses (a), (b) or (c). The 
Minister continued: "It is my opinion that this material was 
supplied in confidence and I believe that the making available of 
the information could prejudice the supply of similar informa-
tion. 1112 This directly conflicts with the Departmental advice 
and the Ombudsman's conclusion on this point. The Minister, 
cited no factual basis for his conclusions, and the point does 
not appear to have been reasoned at length. This is unfortunate 
since both Sections 9(2) (b) and 8(1) (c) require the information 
to be "supplied in confidence". r--b one seems to have bothered to 
ask the Companies whether they thought they were supplying 
information in confidence. 
2.2.5 It is interesting too, to note the contrast be t ween the comments 
made by the Ombudsman on this case and those of the Minister. 
The ombudsman's consideration of the case covers more than four 
pages. The Minister in his veto statement states his "grounds" 
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[which he is required to state in terms of Section 32(4)(b) J in 
three sentences none of them particularly lengthy. The 
Minister states no factual basis for his decision but simply 
asserts a personal opinion. f-E refers to "competitive commercial 
activities" and "the public interest" without mentioning the 
sections of the Act from which those phrases are taken and 
without considering the context in which the words appear. The 
question of whether such an incomplete statement is sufficient to 
comply with the requirement of Section 32(4)(b) that the "grounds 
for the direction of decision" be stated, is a question which 
arises for discussion later. 
2.2.6 Finally the Minister said in his veto statement: "This decision 
is not based on any advice. 1113 Section 32(4) (c) requires the 
Minister to disclose "the source and purport of any advice on 
which the direction or decision is based". So far, most vetoes 
have been based on Departmental advice. Unfortunately one could 
easily conclude that the Minister's final sentence reflects an 
autocratic attitude to the whole issue. The question of the 
character of the Ministerial veto also arises for consideration 
later. 
2.3 Two Other cases 
2.3.1 The problem of a conflict between the Departmental view and that 
of the Minister arose in two other cases. First there is the 
case concerning the Education Department's Notes to the 
Estimates. 14 This was a request for the notes prepared to 
assist the Minister in Parliamentary debate. Section 9(2)(f)(iv) 
of the Act ("confidentiality of advice tendered to Ministers of 
the Crown and officials") was relied on in withholding the 
information. The Ombudsman again found "While the Department 
favoured release of the Notes, the Minister wished them to be 
withheld until after the Estimates had been debated in Parlia.-
ment. 1115 The Ombudsman referred to a cabinet directive that 
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such notes should be withheld only "in a rare case" . 16 The 
Minister withdrew his objection. 
2. 3. 2 Just to illustrate that this is not a problem unique to the 
Department of Education and its previous Minister, the other such 
case I will mention involves the Reserve Bank. 17 Its Minister 
was the then Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. The case 
concerned a request for correspondence between the Prime Minister 
and the Reserve Bank and for information about Kiwi Savings 
Stock. Again the Minister was consulted before the decision was 
finally reached. However in this instance the Bank and its 
solici tars had already formed a view that "the correspondence 
fell comfortably within Section 9(2) (g) of the Act" .18 The 
Minister simply confirmed the initial view: "The Governor's 
letter was returned to the Bank with a notation by the Prime 
Minister 'I do not think it should be released. 11119 
2.3.3 The Ombudsman accepted that this was 
been taken in the two Education 
above. re said: 20 
not the same approach as had 
Department cases mentioned 
"I agreed that it was not inappropriate for the 
Governor to consult the Minister. I also accepted 
that the Directors, while taking account of his 
view, acted properly in setting that view on one 
side when making their decision on the request. 
That, in my view, accords with the intention of the 
Act." 
The Ombudsman gave further emphasis to the need for impartiality 
on the Minister's part: 
"If consultation with a Minister were carried to the 
point where he was asked whether he would direct 
that any recommendation by an Ombudsman should not 
be implemented, that in my opinion would be 
improper. If, on the other hand, the organisation 
was influenced in its decision primarily by a 
Minister's wish to have the information withheld, 
that would also, for the reasons set out above, be 
unacceptable. 11 21 
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2.3 .4 In terms of the Act, the Ombudsman's approach appears correct. 
The department received the request and it must make 
1-bwever, in practice, the situation is not so simple. 
Department is not a monolithic entity. It consists 
a decision. 
First, the 
of a large 
number of people. Their views will often differ among themsel-
ves. Ultimately each case will be decided by one person. In 
more difficult cases this will often be the permanent head. In 
that event, what is the distinction between the case being 
referred upwards to · the permanent head and the case being 
ref erred to the Minister. The Minister, after all, unlike the 
public servants is elected and is ultimately responsible to the 
electorate and to Parliament. When any really contentious 
decisions is to be made, it is the Minister who should say "the 
buck stops here". This may be even more so where the information 
requested was prepared by or for the Minister or for cabinet. In 
practical terms, the circumstances must dictate the extent to 
which the Minister is involved in the original decision. These 
circumstances include not only who the request was sent to and 
who holds the information, but also its origin, the purpose for 
its collection and the degree of sensitivity or controversy 
involved. An official who rushes to see the Minister about every 
minor request of a routine nature is a nuisance; an official who 
blithely releases economic intellligence without any consultation 
is a menace. 
2.3.5 The point however is not just that some Departments or Ministers 
had had difficulties in knowing what was their proper role under 
the new . Act. The problems also illustrate a conceptual 
difficulty inherent in the Act. To what extent can the 
Department be separated from its Minister? There is also the 
practical problem of cases in which the information is held by 
the Minister solely or the request for information is addressed 
to the Minister. Under Section 15 of the Act it appears that the 
Minister should then make the initial decision on release of the 
information. In those circumstances the approach espoused by the 
Ombudsman becomes irrelevant and we are left with the problem of 
------
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the Ombudsman reviewing a Minister's decision, knowing that the 
same Minister will be able to veto the Ombudsman's recommendation. 
2.3.6 On another view it could be said that the Act potentially drives 
a wedge between the Minister and Department. If the Departmental 
officer resolves to release information, but (for whatever 
reason) the officer is made aware of Ministerial opposition to 
release in this instance or the officer receives a Ministerial 
directive not to release, then the official is caught on the 
horns of a dilemma. If he releases the information he will incur 
the Minister's displeasure. That is not, of course, the end of 
the world. But it may make things awkward for the official in 
the meantime. If he does not release, it may be in some 
instances that he is acting contrary to the Act and could, 
conceivably, be subject to judicial action to force him to act in 
accordance with the Act. For many the former may appear the 
safer or more comfortable course of action. 
2.4 The Department's Relationship With Its Minister 
2.4.1 While it is, of course, possible to exaggerate unnecessarily the 
extent to which the cases referred to above indicate a likely 
source of discord for the future, it should be said that there is 
an inherent awkwardness with a situation which gives the 
Ombudsman power to review a Minister's decision, but subjects the 
Ombudsman's recommendation to the Minister's veto. It is, of 
course, obvious that a Minister's initial decision under Section 
15 must be reviewable by the Ombudsman. If this were not so, 
unscrupulous officials might be tempted to use Ministerial 
decisions as a device to avoid the Ombudsman's scrutiny. On the 
other hand, the "Danks Committee 1122 which drew up the original 
proposals on which the Act was based, recognished it was making a 
marked departure from previous practice in giving the Ombudsman 
t • • • t I d ' • d ' d 23 power o review Minis er s ecisions an commente : 
• 
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"101. This proposed change is not inconsistent with 
the principles underlying the office of the 
Ombudsmen. The Ombudsman (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration) in the United 
Kingdom has power to investigate and report in 
respect of ministerial decisions. 
"102. The proposal is also compatible with the 
principal of ministerial responsibility. 
Procedure would be informal rather than 
formal. As at present the Ombudsmen would not 
have powers of decision; they would investi-
gate, and, if appropriate, recommend a 
different decision or practice. Ministers, 
subject to public and parliamentary scrutiny, 
a scrutiny enhanced by the Ombudsmen's 
investigations and reports, would in general 
still decide." 
2.4.2 Undoubtedly the procedure contemplated as normal by the Act is 
that mentioned by the Ombudsman in the cases referred to above. 
That, however, does not mean that different procedures may not be 
appropriate in some circumstances. The right of a Minister to 
direct or control a department varies from one department to 
another. Originally most Departments of State were established 
under the Royal Prerogative, 24 but in t\ew Zealand most 
Departments now operate under a speci fie statute. The position 
of the individual public servant in a department established 
under the Prerogative was fairly straightforward: 
"Where functions entrusted to a Minister or to a 
Department are performed by an official employed in 
the Ministry or Department, there is in law no 
delegation because constitutionally the official's 
act or decision is that of the Minister. 11 25 
2.4.3 The most common situation in New Zealand today is for the 
Departmental statute to establish the Department and to 
acknowledge the existence of its Minister. The Department 
operates "under the control of" the Minister who may give the 
permanent head or the Department directions as to how the 
Department shall operate and the Minister may delegate functions 
to the permanent head or other officials. 26 At the other 
extreme are the "Quangos 11 and trading departments whose Minister 
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is mentioned in their Act but has little in the way of functions 
or control specified in the Act. 27 In these cases the 
Minister's functions are often limited to complaints procedures 
and sometimes financial control. There are also however some 
anomalous cases in which the respective functions of Minister and 
Department are more confused. 
2.4.4 One such case appears in the Land Act which by Section 4 
establishes the Department of Lands and Survey and then states: 
II (2) The Department shall consist of -
(a) The Minister of Lands: 
(b) The Director-General of Lands: 
(f) Such Commissioners, Chief Surveyors, 
surveyors, clerks .... " 
A similar case appears in the Public Works Act 1981 which by 
Section 5 establishes the Department under the control of the 
Minister as usual, but then states in Section 5(7): 
"The Minister shall be charged with the execution of 
Government Works and may, for the purpose of 
enabling the Ministry to carry out any of its 
functions and powers, give to the Commissioner of 
Works such directions as it thinks fit." 
2.4.5 The question which now arises is whether it is possible to 
divorce the Minister from the Department in the way the Act and 
the Ombudsman appear to require. If (as is stated to be the case 
under the prerogative28) the action of the official is 
constitutionally the action of the Minister, does it make any 
difference whether the official has sought the guidance of or 
directions of the Minister? Moreover, if the Departmental Act 
states that the Department is to operate under the control of its 
Minister, is there not a Statutory authority for the very 
procedure so roundly condemned by the Ombudsman - acting on 
Ministerial instructions not to release the information. 
• 
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2.4.6 01e Departmental statute which goes further than the others is 
the Maori Affairs Act 1953, Section 4 of which lists, among other 
things, as one of the functions of the Department that it shall 
give effect under the direction of the Minister to provisions of 
that Act and other Acts. In this case at least, the Minister's 
authority to give directions about Official Information matters 
appears clear. 
2.5 Some Possible Solutions 
2.5.l Officials should not consult the Minister before deciding on 
release of information - or, at least, they should not do so so 
often. The Ombudsman advocates the view that the official may 
consult the Minister but must not allow the Minister's view to 
overrule the conclusion reached by the official. It can also be 
argued that for an Official to defer to Ministerial advice or 
directions constitutes an invalid delegation of powers. The 
decision under the Act is to be made by the Department. The New 
Zealand cases on delegation of statutory authority do not treat 
every delegation as invalid. 29 f-bwever there is clear 
authority that a delegation is invalid if it has the effect of 
avoiding the procedure specifically set down for making the 
particular type of decision in question. 30 While the act of 
the official is that of the Minister, the converse is not 
necessarily true. 
2. 5. 2 While the Minister may control the Department, the Department 
must still act independently in exercising a duty imposed on it 
by a particular statute. Authority for this is the case of 
Social Security Commission v. MacFar lane. 31 In that case the 
Minister had given the Commission directions as to its exercise 
of its discretionary authority under a specific statute. 32 The 
Statute required the Commission to act under the "general 
direction and control" of the Minister. The Judge said: 
2.5.3 
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"In my view, the words 'general direction and 
control , ' considered in their context, have a 
meaning which falls short of direction in the sense 
of dictation. Where a statute contains detailed 
provisions as to its application I consider clear 
language is necessary to show that Parliament 
intended that a drastic alteration can be made by 
Ministerial direction. 1133 
State Services Commission (No. A similar case is Elston v. 
3). 34 The Commission wished to suspend workers it believed 
would not carry out their usual duties. Section 10(1) of the 
State Services Act 1962 required that the Commission act 
"independently". The workers alleged the Commission had acted on 
the directions of the Minister and not independently. The judge 
did not agree there was sufficient evidence to prove this. He 
said: 
"Argument was addressed to me as to the meaning of 
the word 'independently'. In my view, the 
Commission does not have to act with the complete 
and utter independence that a Judge must possess. 
It is unreal to suggest otherwise. Mr Mathieson was 
right in submitting that 'independently' in this 
context did not mean to act in complete isolation 
from and without consultation with. Because of the 
thin line between policy and individual rights, the 
word must mean in the context of Section 10(1) 'not 
depending on. 1135 
From the MacFarlane and Elston cases, two points emerge. First, 
the statute must be speci fie in requiring a governmental agency 
to act independently of its Minister. Second, consultation with 
the Minister is not improper, provided the agency or official 
ultimately makes the decision without being bound by the 
ministerial "advice". The exact requirements of acting 
"independently" will, it appears, vary according to the context 
of the statute in question. rbwever, the courts do accept (in 
conformity with the rule that general statutory words do not 
overrule the provisions of a statute dealing with a specific 
matter) that a statute may require an agency to act indepen-
dently; this specific provision is treated as an exception to the 
I 
-
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general provision in the departmental Act that the department is 
under the control of the Minister. 
2.5.4 On that basis and in the context of the Official Information Act, 
it is, I think, clear that the Department statutes in mo~t cases 
do not authorise the Minister to control the Department's 
decisions under Section 15 of the Act. This is, of course, even 
more so, in the case of quangos and such like whose Ministers do 
not have general powers of control and direction. However the 
situation is less clear where the Minister is effectively an 
officer of the Department. 36 In those unusual cases, it could 
be argued that the Minister can make the decision in the 
Department's name. rbwever, the better view appears to be that 
the Official If)formation Act in its speci fie provisions is not 
affected by the general words of the departmental Acts. 
2. 5. 5 The Ombudsman has already commented37 that since the Minister 
can in effect veto the Ombudsman's decision, it is wrong that the 
Minister should get what ~ would call "two bites of the cherry". 
On the other hand it can be argued that if the Minister cannot 
control what information is released by the Department, then his 
veto power is ·of little use. In other words, if the Department 
decides to release information as requested and despite the views 
of the Minister to the contrary, then there will be no review by 
the Ombudsman and no opportunity for the Minister to exercise his 
veto. The answer to this is, I suppose, that the Minister's veto 
is not intended as an overriding power to be exercised arbi-
trarily or at the Minister's whim. The veto, like all other 
decisions taken under the Act, should be exercised after 
considering the detailed criteria in the Act and bearing in mind 
the public interest. t'-bnetheless, there is still a Departmental 
tendency in some cases to say: "When in doubt, don't release it." 
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2.6 Constitutional Developments 
2.6.l This section of the paper can, I think, be best concluded by 
considering briefly the constitutional point at issue. The 
extent to which the relationship between Minister and Department 
has changed, is well illustrated in the following comment: 
"The alder pattern of relationships between 
ministers and public servants has lost much of its 
coherence. One minister stresses the privacy of the 
advice which it is his responsibility to adopt or 
reject. Another minister distances himself from his 
department, noting that, on a particular matter, the 
department's view was allowed to prevail; but now he 
is asking the same question again, and will 
reconsider his position when he has the department's 
response. cabinet and Parliamentary committees cut 
in upon the private line between a minister and his 
department. A party leader in opposition is 
sufficiently uncertain of the prevailing mores to 
announce that, in government, his party will require 
the resignation of any permanent head who is unable 
to go along with its policies. Probably in New 
Zealand we have already gone too far ever to 
reinstate the simple doctrine that a minister and 
his department are one. 11 38 
2.6.2 The decisions taken so far under the Act reveal, I believe, this 
new constitutional development. The relationship between 
Minister and Department is changing. The old assumption that the 
Minister is the Department is no longer entirely accurate. A 
large modern Government Department can after. become a very 
separate entity. The Act, in tacitly accepting this situation, 
opened up this development for possible scrutiny. The Courts 
appear to have accepted this change. In this light, the conflict 
(or, more correctly, disagreement) between Minister and 
Department appears to be less dramatic - it may indeed be a 
healthy thing. 
3. 
3.1 
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PRIVILEGE CLAIMS 
This Section 3 looks at another group of cases - those involving 
a claim to legal professional privilege under Section 9(2)(h) of 
the Act. These cases highlight the role of the Ombudsman under 
the Act and indicate some ways in which his functions have 
shifted as a result of the Act. Again three cases from the 
Ombudsman's case ~tes will be considered. The law relating to 
Legal Professional Privilege will also be discussed, together 
with the relevance to one of these cases of law on Copyright. 
From these matters it becomes clear, I believe, that the 
Ombudsman is now involved to a greater extent than previously in 
considering matters of law. In this area the Ombudsman's role 
begins to overlap with that of the courts in deciding the extent 
of legal privilege and the circumstances in which it will apply. 
3.2 The very existence of legal professional privilege as a ground 
for withholding information has drawn some criticism. A senior 
surgeon has commented: 39 
" ... I must say I find it intriguing that our 
law-makers continually give considerable regard to 
the maintenance of legal professional privilege. 
Maybe it's a reflection of the number of lawyers in 
Parliament; in any case, they have indeed done so in 
the Official Information Act. On the other hand, 
however, doctors and other health professionals, 
working under similar ethical rules of confidenti-
ality, receive no such protection, and to my 
knowledge never have." 
One answer to that might be that such legislative provisions are 
simply the result of the Courts' inveterate habit of assuming 
that statutes are not intended to derogate from the common law 
rules on legal professional privilege. The courts traditionally 
have read down the provisions of any statute which might conflict 
. th 1 1 . · 1 40 P h . th f . wi ega privi ege. er aps some in o er pro essions 
might comment that this is a relection of the number of judges 
who are lawyers. 
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3.3 The cases Considered by the Ombudsman 
3. 3 .1 The Ombudsman accepted that legal professional privilege applied 
in a case where a request was made for a copy of a draft bill, 
called the "Competition Bill. 1141 The draft bill had never been 
introduced into Parliament and had, in effect, been abandoned. 
The Ombudsman found that "The requisite relationship of solicitor 
and client exists between Parliamentary Counsel and the 
Government. As legal professional privilege is regarded by the 
Courts as extending to salaried legal advisers of Government 
Departments, the argument that the withholding_ of the information 
in question was necessary to maintain legal professional 
privilege was established by the Secretary. 1142 
The Ombudsman further concluded that there was no countervailing 
public interest to override the privilege since the Bill could be 
changed at any time or abandoned and once introduced into 
parliament would be subject to parliamentary privilege. This was 
a case, of course, where Section 9(2) (g) of the Act ("free and 
frank expression of opinions") could also have applied, but this 
point was not considered by the Ombudsman as he had already 
accepted that the privilege applied to the whole bill. 
3. 3. 2 On the other hand, legal privilege has not been accepted by the 
Ombudsman in two cases. One case involved an assessor's report 
to the Earthquake and War Damage Commission. 43 The Commission 
argued that the privilege applied as the report was obtained, 
among other reasons, in the expectation that litigation might 
eventuate over the claim made on it. The Ombudsman in consider-
ing the claim to privilege, laid emphasis on the word necessary 
in Section 9(2) - a point to which I shall return later. 
On the privilege issue the Ombudsman referred to two legal 
authorities. The first was an extract from Cross on Evidence44 
which laid emphasis on the point that the information must be 
communicated to the lawyer "for the purpose of obtaining advice 
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or contemplated litigation. 45 The second 
an unreported judgment, then just recently 
upon pending 
authority was 
delivered. 46 In that case Wallace J. had ruled that the 
assessor's report was protected even though the reference to 
legal advisers was not the principal reason for obtaining the 
report. 1-bwever the Ombudsman also quoted the judge's comments 
that: "I would agree that where there is no or little or only 
incidental thought of litigation, assessors' reports will not be 
privileged under the appreciable purpose test. ,A7 The 
Ombudsman concluded that advice concerning possible litigation 
was not an appreciable purpose. 
3.3.3 The other case where a claim to privilege was rejected by the 
Ombudsman involved an index of decisions of the Transport 
Ucensing Appeal Authority. The index was compiled by staff of 
the N. Z. Railways Corporation for internal use. The Corporation 
was not prepared to release it to the requester. The attitude of 
the Corporation, in the circumstances, was understandable. The 
Corporation can forgiven for regarding the requester in the same 
light as counsel in Court proceedings who, in order to avoid 
having to do his own case research, asked for an Order for 
discovery to make the other side's research available to him. 
1-bwever, the index is, of course, official information and the 
Ombudsman again referred to Cross on Evidence48 to emphasise 
that privilege only attaches to communications between solicitor 
and client. In this instance, the Ombudsman could not see how 
the index could be the result of communications with the legal 
staff of the Corporation as opposed to communications between the 
various members of the legal staff. 
3.4 The Law Regarding Legal Professional Privilege 
3.4 .1 Since these last two decisions of the Ombudsman seem to rne to 
involve substantially legal questions, it is use ful to consider 
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in more depth the law relating to legal privilege. In Halsbury's 
Laws of England it is summarised as follows: 49 
"Confidential communications passing between a 
client and his legal adviser and made for the 
purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice are in 
general, privileged from disclosure ... Confidential 
communications other than those passing between a 
client and his legal adviser are not privileged from 
disclosure." 
3.4.2 One of the best judgments in this area is that of Lord Denning MR 
in Alfred Crompton v. customs & Excise Commissioners where he 
considered the position of salaried legal advisers 11 : 50 
" .... Many barristers and solicitors are employed as 
legal advisers, whole time, by a single employer. 
In every case these legal advisers do legal 
work for their employer and for no one else. They 
are paid, not by fees for each piece of work, but by 
a fixed annual salary. They are, no doubt, servants 
or agents of the employer .... They are regarded by 
the law as in every respect in the same position as 
those who practise on their own account. I 
have always proceeded on the footing that the 
communications between the legal advisers and their 
employer (who is their client) are the subject of 
legal professional privilege; and I have never known 
it questioned. I speak, of course, of their 
communications in the capacity of legal advisers. 
It does sometimes happen that such a legal adviser 
does work for his employer in another capacity, 
perhaps of an executive nature. Their communica-
tions in that capacity would not be the subject of 
legal professional privilege. " 
3.4.3 The privilege also extends to a solicitor who has ceased to 
practise51 and to an attorney's clerk52 so a qualified 
legal clerk, who does not hold a current practising certificate 
but is employed in a legal section, could claim privilege. But 
the communications must be referrable to the relationship of 
solicitor and client. 53 
3.4.4 The question of the extent to which litigation must be anticipa-
ted was also considered by Lord Denning. 54 He said: 
• 
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"I ask myself: can the commissioners properly claim 
legal professional privilege for these internal 
documents? I think they can. It is true that the documents were not obtained solely or merely or 
principally for their solicitor. They were obtained primarily in order to enable the commissioners to form their own opinion of the justice of the company's claim to deductions. But, at the same 
time, they were obtained as material to place before the solicitor if it came to a fight, as the 
commissioners anticipated that it might..... The case seems to me very much like a case where the head office of a company is concerned with the way a 
branch manager is handling its moneys, and instructs 
its accounts department to look into it , realising that, if the investigation should disclose 
irregularities, the matter will be placed in the hands of their solicitor. In such a case the internal memoranda passing between the accounts department and the other departments in the course of the investigations is privileged ..... "55 
There is a fairly strong parallel between the situation posited 
by Lord Denning and that in the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission case referred to earlier. 
3.4.5 1-bwever the question of the application of legal professional 
privilege it reports obtained for a dual purpose was reconsidered 
more recently by the 1-buse of Lords in Waugh v. British Railways 
Board. 56 Lord Simon referred to two conflicting principles: 
"Historically, the second principle, that a litigant 
must bring forward his own evidence to support his 
case, and cannot call on his adversary to make or aid it, was fundamental to the outlook of the courts 
of common law. The first principle, that the opponent might be compelled to disclose relevant evidence in his possession, was the doctrine of 
Dlancery, a court whose conscience would be affronted by forensic success contrary to justice obtained merely through the silent non-co-operation 
of the defendant, and which therefore had some 
inclination to limited inquisitorial procedures. The conflict between the Dlancery and the courts of common law was, here as elsewhere, ultimately 
resolved by compromise and accommodation. 1157 
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The f-buse of Lords in Waugh overruled many earlier cases and 
ruled that a document is privileged only if communication with 
legal advisers is the "dominant purpose" for bringing the 
document into existence. The New Zealand Court of Appeal had 
earlier applied the "appreciable purpose" test. 58 Whether the 
test of ·~ominant purpose" or "appreciable purpose" is applied, 
the decision must be the same in the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission case - the report was not privileged. However, it is 
clear from Lord Denning's comments that this is an issue on which 
even very experienced judges have disagreed in the past. 
3.4.6 Legal privilege has been further extended to cover not only 
anticipated litigation, but also anticipated administrative 
investigation. In West-Walker, 59 North J. said of legal 
privilege: 
"The Solicitor-General claimed that this rule was 
only a rule of evidence and, therefore, had no 
application to enquiries made by executive officers 
pursuant to statutory authority. I do not agree. 
It finds expression, it is true, in Court procee-
dings, but it would be wrong, I think, to regard the 
rule as being of limited application. It is more 
than a contractual obligation. It rests, in my 
opinion, on the wider ground of public policy and, 
therefore, applies generally unless the terms of a 
particular statute either expressly or by necessary 
implication remove the protection." 
Of course, investigations by the Ombudsman could be covered by 
this rule. Presumably, communications between a department and 
its legal advisers made in contemplation of an investigation by 
the Ombudsman under the Act are privileged! More important, 
however, is the need to recognise that legal privilege potenti-
ally has a very wide ambit. 6° For this reason there seems to 
be some tendency for departments to tend to rely on privilege 
under Section 9(2)(h) rather than other provisions such as 
Section 9(2) (g) which may be more appropriate. That certainly 
seems to be a point which arises from both the "Competition Bill" 
and the "Railways Index" cases. The reasoning seems to be that 
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the Ombudsman is more likely to accept a claim to legal 
privilege, the ground rules for which are laid out in the court 
decisions, rather than the more nebulous appeals to "consti tu-
tional conventions" or "free and frank expressions of opinion" 
which are more difficult to substantiate. 
3.4. 7 Claims to legal privilege are also open to abuse. It would be 
unfortunate if one result of the Act is to further expand the 
"when in doubt, send it to 'legal'" syndrome. The point is that 
officials who believe they have genuine grounds for withholding 
information should state those grounds rather than sheltering 
behind legal privilege. 
3.5 Privilege and the Ombudsman 
3.5.1 Looking back at the three cases concerning privilege, investi-
gated by the Ombudsman, these cases can be examined in the light 
of the court decisions referred to. It is clear from the cases 
that legal professional privilege does extend to cases such as 
the "Competition Bill" case. It might have been more interesting 
if the case had been considered under Section 9(2)(f) and (g) in 
the Ombudsman's case note, since the real reason the Deaprtment 
wished to avoid disclosure was (I suspect) its desire to preserve 
the confidentiality of it$ advice to the Government. One could 
also question whether withholding the whole bill was "necessary" 
to maintain legal professional privilege - the Ombudsman did not 
consider the possibility of releasing part only of the bill. The 
Ombudsman's recommendation in the "Earthquake & War Damage 
Commission" case accords with the English and New Zealand 
authorities. 
3.5.2 I am less happy with the "Railways Index". In strict law the 
Ombudsman is no doubt correct. The index is official information 
and is not the resul t of a communication with legal advisers. 
f-bwever the index was prepared in anticipation of proceedings 
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before a tribunal and for no other purpose. Given the broad and 
liberal approach of the Courts to privilege claims, it is 
possible that a Court could accept a claim for privilege in the 
circumstances. Clearly the index was prepared by the solicitors 
for the benefit of their client and in anticipation that the 
client would require the information in future proceedings. 
There is already authority for the proposition that the enquiries 
made by a solicitor on behalf of a client may be privileged61 -
in other words the information was not actually communicated by 
the client to the solicitor, but obtained by the solicitor for 
the clients benefit. 
3.5.3 The rationale for legal privilege was well explained in the US 
62 case Mead Data, where the court held that the government was: 
"dealing with its attorneys as would any private 
party seeking advice to protect personal interests, 
and needs the same assurance of confidentiality so 
it will not be deterred from full and frank 
communications with its counsellors ... " 
If the reason for privilege is that the public interest requires 
that each party to a legal dispute should have "full and frank 
communications" and thus be able to present his case to the best 
advantage, then the Railways, like any other person, has a right 
(indeed a need) to deal with its solicitors in confidence. 
Sim'ilar ly, if one refers to the second principle mentioned by 
Lord Simon, 63 one could ask: should the litigant not bring 
forward his own research into the earlier cases and not call on 
his adversary to make or aid it. 
3.5.L1 Whether that need to deal in confidence should extend to the 
results of the legal adviser's research into the legal authori-
ties, is another matter. Certainly none of the case law I have 
found would suggest the privilege should extend that far. 
Equally there are no cases I can find which would suggest it will 
not extent that far. 
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The question of the application of the Copyright Act 1962 in this 
case was not considered by the Ombudsman. While not wishing to 
enter into a detailed consideration of Copyright law, some points 
can be made from reference to the Copyright Act. The index would 
be classed as a "literary work" which "includes any written table 
or compilation" (Section 2).The index is therefore protected 
(Section 9) and "reproducing the work in any material form" 
constitutes an infringement (Section 7(3)(a)). There is 
protection for "fair dealing" but this largely covers "research 
or private study" and "criticism or review" (Section 20). 
3.5.5 rbwever, the Official Information Act, being an Act which 
specifically deals with the question of release of information, 
must, I think, be taken to apply in preference to the general 
provisions of the Copyright .£\et. Certainly Section 52(3) (b) of 
the Official Information Act cannot be taken to mean that the 
Official Information Act is to be read subject to the general 
Acts such as the Copyright Act. 
If the Copyright Act does not prevail, a further difficulty 
arises. If the information has already been published, can the 
information still be requested under the · Official Information 
Act? Presumably so, although the Department could charge for it 
so that there would be no advantage to using the Act. So, if a 
Department thinks that information of this type may be requested, 
it may be better for it to publish the in formation for all to 
obtain - at a reasonable price. 
3.5.6 My comments in this subsection 3.5 are not intended as a 
criticism of the Chief Ombudsman. Some of these cases involve 
what must, on any view, be regarded as "nice" questions of law. 
Rather, my point is that the Ombudsman under the Official 
Information Act is drawn more into making recommendations 
touching matters of law. In doing so, he is necessarily required 
to approach his task in much the same manner as a judge would 
do. Unfortunately the Ombudsman does not always have all the 
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advantages and resources of the judges. This is a difficulty 
which has not arisen in other jurisdictions such as the United 
States which give a stronger role to the courts in deciding on 
access to information. The question of the extent to which the 
Act makes it possible, and in some cases desirable, to apply for 
judicial review of the Ombudsman's recommendations arises later 
in this paper. 
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4. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT 
4.1 The Danks Committee specifically designed the Act to set general 
guidelines rather than inflexible rules. On the subject of 
exemptions contained in overseas legislation, the committee said: 
"These exemptions tend to be drafted in broad terms 
which leave open questions of interpretation, or 
they go into excessive detail which sometimes 
appears to reflect defensive attitudes. 1164 
Interpretation of the Act thus becomes an important function. 
This Section 4 therefore looks at two examples - two instances in 
which the Ombudsman has aroused controversy by the manner in 
which he has interpreted those parts of the Act which are drafted 
in broad terms. 
4.2 Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
4.2.l The first of these instances is the Ombudsman's statement that 
for information to be withheld under Section 9 of the Act, there 
must be "proof beyond reasonable doubt". This is at first sight 
surprising since that standard of proof is normally confined to 
criminal proceedings. Official Information is essentially a 
civil matter and one would have expected the civil standard of 
proof on the balance of probabilities to be applied. 
4.2.2 The Ombudsman is not alone in concluding that the burden of 
proof is on the department wishing to withhold information. Mr 
David Baragwanath Q.C. is of the view that: 
"The scheme of Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 (2), particu-
larly when read with Section 5, places the burden of 
proof upon the Crown in each case. This burden must 
be applied by department, Ombudsman and Minister; if 
not applied there is a reviewable error of law. 
Only where the Section 9(2) onus is satisfied does 
the burden pass on application (sic) of Section 
9(1).1165 
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4.2.3 f-bwever the Ombudsman goes further than this in setting the 
standard of proof at the level of beyond reasonable doubt. To do 
this, the Ombudsman looks to the word . "necessary" in the opening 
words of Section 9(2) which are: 
"Subject to Sections 6, 7, 8 ( 1) , 10 and 18 of this 
Act, this section applies if, and only if, the 
withholding of the information is necessary to .... " 
Some emphasis could justifiably be placed also on the words "if, 
and only if". 
4.2.4 The Ombudsman's reasoning is then stated as follows:-
"For 'necessity' to be established, the unavoidable 
consequence of disclosure would have to be failure 
to achieve one of Section 9(2)(h), (j) or (k). 
Proof that a consequence would follow disclosure 
must approach that of beyond reasonable doubt if it 
is to be regarded as unavoidable. That strict proof 
is required follows from the hierarchy in the 
protection provisions in Par I of the Act: 'Can 
reasonably be expected" (Section 8); 'is likely to' 
(Sections 6 - 7); and 'is necessary to' (Section 
9).1166 
The Ombudsman referred to dictionary definitions of the word 
"necessary" which refer to the idea of inevitability and 
continued: 
"Just as more, and more cogent, evidence is required 
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that A 
committed murder than that he exceeded a speed 
limit, so too more , and more cogent , evidence is 
required to establish on the balance of probabili-
ties that a consequence is unavoidable than that it 
is likely. In practice this amounts to much the 
same as that proof should be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. 11 67 
4. 2. 5 Some commentators have er iticised this conclusion. 
68 The 
Ombudsman appears to move from accepting that proof on the 
balance of probabilities is appropriate and, by arguing that more 
cogent evidence is required, moves to the conclusion that proof 
-----
-
1111 
- 29 -
beyond reasonable doubt is required. With all due respect, I 
think the Ombudsman has confused three things: the factual 
requirements; the burden of proof; and the standard of proof. 
4.2.6 Perhaps the matter can be better understood if three questions 
are asked: What? Who? and f-bw? These may be answered as follows: 
(a) What? 
(b) Who? 
(c) f-bw? 
(the facts which must be proved) - that 
withholding the information in question is 
necessary to maintain legal professional 
privilege. 
proof) 
which 
the 
believes 
department/ 
it should 
(the burden of 
Minister/Quango 
withhold the information must provide the 
proof. 
( the standard of proof) - on the balance of 
probabilities. 
4.2.7 Put like that, it is, I think, clear that the Ombudsman's 
contention that the need for more cogent evidence means proof 
beyond reasonable doubt has confused the issues. Moreover, the 
standard of proof remains the same for all criminal charges, 
including murder and exceeding the speed limit. The standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt applies in both those cases. 
Reference may also be made to case of~ v. f.:_ which held (among 
other things) that the appropriate common law standard of proof 
is only displaced by very clear statutory language.
69 
4.3 The Constitutional Conventions 
4.3.1 Section 9(2)(f) breaks new ground by referring, for the first 
time in a New Zealand statute, to the constitutional conven-
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tions. Four specific conventions are mentioned. ClJviously, 
since the reference to these conventions as a part of a statutory 
requirement marks a new departure, some initial difficulties in 
interpretation are to be expected. 
4.3.2 There are three basic considerations:-
4.3.3 
(a) Each convention is "unwritten" in the sense that it 
has not previously been referred to in any 
enactment. The exact extent of the application of 
the convention is not always certain. 
(b) The act refers to the conventions "for the time 
being". The conventions can be, and have been, 
changed. It may be difficult to know if the 
convention has been changed. The only way of 
knowing is to look at the practise of those 
involved. The Ombudsman commented: "As to the 
confidentiality of advice, I believe the Ombudsman 
Act 1975 has already been responsible for some 
modification of this convention. 1170 
(c) Constitutional conventions are from time to time 
broken. For example the convention on ministerial 
responsibility has not been observed on occasion: a 
minister may claim to be "responsible" but not to 
blame. As the Ombudsman observed: "The nature of a 
constitutional convention is such that it can be 
departed from without necessarily impairing its 
effectiveness". 71 
In one case 72 there was a difference of opinion between the 
Ombudsman and the Reserve Bank as to the exact extent of the 
convention ref erred to in Section '9 ( 2) ( f) (iv) of the Act: "The 
Confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and 
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Officials". The difference of opinion was recorded by the 
Ombudsman as follows: 
"The Bank informed me, without providing any 
evidence to support its view, that it considered 
there was an unwritten constitutional convention in 
New Zealand that Ministerial advisers do not make 
public the advice tendered to Ministers. The 
Directors of the Bank also considered a convention 
existed that advice to a Minister should remain 
confidential unless the Minister chooses to release 
it. 
I was unable to accept the proposition that any such 
convention, however it was defined, required that 
all advice in all circumstances when tendered by 
offocials to Ministers, was confidential. 1173 
4.3.4 Since the Act specifically refers to this convention, it is clear 
the convention exists, or at least is to be deemed to exist for 
the purposes of the Act. The Ombudsman's point, however, is that 
the convention does not cover all such advice. Just which advice 
and what circumstances, are covered by the convention? This is a 
matter which will require further consideration. No doubt, in 
time further cases will arise, giving the Ombudsman and officials 
the opportunity to come to some understanding of what information 
is covered by the convention. Such an understanding can best be 
reached between someone acting informally, as the Ombudsman does 
and the Public Service. Involving the courts in such matters 
could well make it more di ff icul t to reach some understanding. 
But in the long run, a judicial ruling would be more authorita-
tive. 
4.3.5 Another case considered by the Ombudsman in which the question of 
the constitutional conventions was raised, concerned a request 
for forward estimates of unemployment provided by the Department 
of Labour. The Department decided to withhold the forecasts 
under Section 9(2)(f)(iii) which refers to the convention 
protecting "the political neutrality of officials". The 
Ombudsman did not believe that release of the forecasts would 
have such a drastic effect and commented: 
• 
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"The Official Information Act, in any event, allows 
the withholding of information only if that is 
'necessary to maintain' the constitutional 
conventions on which reliance is placed. It does 
not use the phrase "constitute a breach" and cannot 
be interpreted to mean that there is to be no 
disclosure of information if a convention would be 
breached. A practical test might therefore be to 
ask whether disclosure of the information in this 
instance would go to the heart of a particular 
convention. This was not established by the 
Secretary. 1174 
The Ombudsman is here emphasising the words "necessary to" in 
Section 9(2) by contrast with the words "would be likely" 
(Sections 6 and 7) and "could reasonably~!xpected" (Section 8). 
4.3.6 The then Acting Minister of Labour disagreed with the Ombudsman 
and exercised his power of veto. Paragraph 2 of his veto reads 
as follows: 75 
4.3.7 
"The grounds for the direction a!.'e that pursuant to 
Section 9 of the Official Information Act, and 
notwithstanding the opinion of the 01ief Ombudsman, 
the release of the information sought would 
undermine the constitutional conventions as to the 
neutrality of officials and the confidentiality of 
their advice. It would also undermine the free and 
frank expression of opinion between Ministers and 
officials and the protection of officials from 
improper pressure or harassment." 
The Minister then went in to itemise several matters indicating 
his reasons for his conclusions. It should however be noted that 
the veto directive neatly sidesteps the Ombudsman's arguments 
based on the word "necessary" and his observation that the act 
does not ref er to a "breach" of the convention. The minister 
simply says the release of the information would "undermine" the 
convention - does he believe it would go "to the heart" of the 
convention or not? Tne Minister does not say whether he accepts 
the Ombudsman's interpretation of the Act. 
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4.3.8 On the other hand, there do remain good reasons for keeping 
confidential the advice given on some occasions. The Danks 
Committee in its comment on its draft of what ultimately became 
Section (2)(g), included the following quote: 
111 It is useful to recall that the Constitution of 
the United States was itself written in a closed 
meeting in Philadelphia; press and outsiders were 
excluded, and the participants sworn to secrecy. 
Historians are agreed that if the convention's work 
had been made public contemporaneously, it is 
unlikely that the compromises forged in private 
sessions could have been achieved, or even that 
their state governments would have allowed the 
delegates to write a new constitution.' A. Westin, 
Privacy and Freedom (1967), p. 46. 1176 
• • • 
flll 
• 
----
s. 
5.1 
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A COMPARISON OF THE ROLES OF THE MINISTER ANO THE OMBUDSMAN 
This section of the paper examines some of the functions and 
duties that are common to both the Minister and the Ombudsman. 
Both must apply the criteria contained in the Act. If they do 
not do so, each may be the subject of an application for judicial 
review - although to date only one such application has been made 
in connection with the Act. Consideration can also be given to 
the extent to which the Minister, in the exercise of the veto 
under the Act, can be said to be in effect a court of appeal from 
the Ombudsman's recommendation. In practice, to date, Ministers 
have not exhibited many of the attributes of an appellate court. 
Following on from the requirement that both Minister and 
Ombudsman observe the criteria of the Act in making decisions, 
this section examines the extent to which motives and reasons for 
requesting information may be relevant. Strictly speaking they 
are not relevant under the Act, but they may become important in 
some instances - for example when conditions are imposed on 
release of information. 
5.2 Minister and Ombudsmen Alike 
5. 2 .1 As has been said previously the actions of Minister, Ombudsman 
and department alike are all ultimately subject to the same 
constraints. All must apply carefully the various criteria set 
out in the Act. Neither the Ombudsman's recommendation nor the 
Minister's veto is exercisable merely at will; each must exercise 
his powers in terms of the legislation. Moreover, as has been 
noted in Section 4.2 of this paper, there is a clear hierarchy in 
Sections 6 to 9 of the Act - a greater degree of interference 
with the interests to be protected is required by some sections 
than by others. Also Section 9 protects the interests mentioned 
in Section 9(2) only to the extent there is no countervailing 
public interest under Section 9(1). 
- 35 -
5.2.2 As has been noted above, the Act imposes a specific "public duty" 
(Section 32) in some instances. While there is as such no right 
of appeal to the Courts from a decision under the act, there may 
be as Mr Baragwanath noted above "a rev iewable error of 
law". 77 In other words the normal rules of administrative law 
apply, and if the Ombudsman or the Minister has erred in law his 
decision may be reviewed by the courts. This is an important 
control on the Ombudsman and Minister in ensuring that the 
criteria laid down by the Act are adhered to. 
5.2.3 The first reference on the Ombudsman's Case f\btes to an 
application being made to the High Court was in the case of a 
request for the police briefs of evidence in a District Court 
hearing. 78 The police declined the request but the Cknbudsman 
on investigation recommended that the briefs be released. The 
Ombudsman reports that the police applied to the High Court for 
"judicial review 11 • 79 
5.2.4 This, of course, is a matter which is of considerable importance 
- the Ombudsman received a number of similar requests from 
solicitors for those facing criminal charges. It is a matter on 
which a clear ruling by the Courts would be helpful so that 
prosecution and defence alike know where they stand for the 
future. It was therefore an obvious case in which to apply to 
the High Court so that guidelines can be settled. Judicial 
review, as such, would appear to have been inappropriate in this 
case. f-bwever the case is, I believe, a good example of 
instances where judicial review (where available) may have 
advantages in giving certainty where clear rules are desired. 
For this reason judicial review of ministerial vetoes and the 
Ombudsman's recommendations may be considered desirable in some 
cases. 
• • 
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5.3 A Court of Appeal? 
5.3 . l As mentioned above, the Minister's veto powers in many ways have 
the characteristics of a decision on appeal in the Court system. 
In the Reserve Bank case 80 previously mentioned, the Ombudsman 
said: 
5.3.2 
"Under Section 32 of the Act the Minister respon-
sible for the organisation is the final arbiter 
(subject to possible review of his decision by the 
Courts) as to whether information should be made 
available. rbwever, the existence of the special 
procedure set out in that section seems to me to 
preclude reliance at any earlier stage on a 
Minister's view as a ground for withholding 
information. The organisation concerned is obliged, 
in my opinion, to justify its decision by reference 
to specific provisions of the Act. Any other course 
would be an abrogation of the organisation's 
responsibilities under the Act. 11 81 
rbwever it would be a mistake to regard the Ombudsman simply as a 
lower court and the Minister as an appellate court. For one 
thing, the public have come to regard the Qnbudsman as an 
independent arbiter in government matters - the Minister is seen 
as an involved (and not always unbiased) participant. 82 
Moreover neither Ombudsman nor Minister is necessarily bound by a 
system of precedent. 
5.3.3 Most importantly however, it should be noted that at least one 
Minister, unlike appeal courts in general, apparently considered 
himself not to be in any way confined to the facts or issues 
raised before the Ombudsman. I refer to what was perhaps the 
most unusual Ministerial veto issued to date, namely that in the 
School Computers case. 83 As mentioned earlier the Minister 
specifically stated that his decision was not based on any advice 
(a Court of Appeal which does not hear submissions from either 
side?). The veto ruling is also interesting in this case because 
the Minister relied on different grounds from those considered by 
the Ombudsman and the Department. 
• 
Id 
• 
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5.3.4 It is therefore necessary to beware of placing too much emphasis 
on the appellate nature of the Minister's role. In many ways the 
veto as exercised to date resembles more closely the Presidential 
veto under the US Constitution - it in no way assumes that the 
exerciser of the veto has not previously been closely involved in 
the debate or that he may have come to a decision based on quite 
different considerations. Whether this is correct and whether 
the veto has in each case been properly or validly exercised is a 
matter I wish to come to later . 
5.4 Motives for Request 
5.4.l Finally it should be noted that both Minister and Ombudsman must, 
in applying the criteria contained in the Act, look at each issue 
on the basis of the information requested and not have regard to 
the motives of the requester. The judgment is made about the 
item of information not the requester. The reason for the 
request and the use the information is to be put to are usually 
irrelevant and therefore not stated. 
In some ways this is unfortunate, as those reading reports of 
decisions such as the Onbudsman's Case Notes must sometimes 
wonder why the information is wanted. However, the matter goes 
beyond mere idle curiosity. If it is known that the information 
is wanted for quite innocent purposes, the decision maker must 
surely be more willing to release the information. 
5.4.2 Sometimes, of course, the requesters motives or identity is 
known. The fact that the requester in the "Stud Book" case84 
was a journalist, for instance. In other occasions the identity 
of the requester is only let slip at the end of a report. Thus 
· 85 · t f 1 · ' f t 1n a case concerning a reques or a 1st o emporary 
employees, it is only at the end of the Ombudsman's report that 
he mentions the requester is a Union. I, at least, regarded the 
case in a different light once I discovered that fact. There is 
• • 
5.4.3 
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surely a stronger case for giving the Union a list of workers so 
that it can invite them to join the Union, than there would be 
( for instance) in the case of a mail-order firm simply wanting 
names for addressing "junk mail". 
In that case however the Ombudsman correctly observed that: 
"The Act does not concern itself with the identity 
of an applicant (provided he or she is authorised by 
the Act to request information), or with the reasons 
on which the applicant is or may be basing a request 
for information. While there are circumstances in 
which those reasons could be relevant to my 
consideration of the grounds on which a department 
has declined a request, they were not relevant in 
this case. 1186 
One instance in which motives become relevant is Section 9(2)(k) 
which aims to prevent use of official information "for improper 
gain or improper advantage". There the use to which the 
information will be put becomes relevant. rbwever this 
subsection is only applicable in a limited range of circumstances 
and the Ombudsman in his decisions thus far has been careful not 
to give this clause a very wide application. Similarly, under 
Section 9(1) the motive for .the request or the use to which the 
information will be put, may be relevant in deciding whether 
there is some overriding public interest which requires release 
in a specific case. 
5. 4. 4 Motives are also relevant in cases where conditions are imposed 
on the release of information. The Act does not actually say 
that conditions may be imposed but Section 28(1) (c) does permit 
the Ombudsman to review a decision which "imposes conditions on 
the use, communication or publication of information. " It 
can be argued that this section either: 
(a) Tacitly permits conditions to be imposed, or 
- 39 -
(b) Applies only to the situation where, although the 
Act does not require release of the information, the 
department has decided it could nevertheless release 
the information in this instance provided conditions 
are imposed on its use or republication, or 
(c) Is designed to permit the Ombudsman to review a 
decision imposing conditions where the review is 
merely a convenient way for the Ombudsman to 
determine that conditions have been imposed and for 
him to inform the department concerned that it has 
no power to impose conditions. 
It appears to have been accepted in practice that there is a 
power to impose conditions. Mr Ian Miller of the State Services 
Commission said: 
"The view that has been developed on the use of 
conditions for releasing information is that where 
the organisation can justfy withholding that piece 
of information in terms of one of the reasons given 
in the Act, but where there seems to be some 
countervailing argument in favour of releasing it to 
a particular individual or organisation, then it 
would be proper to do so subject to conditions. The 
example that will be familiar to many people here is 
that of a r~searcher coming to a department. That 
person would be asked to sign a declaration that 
they wouldn't disclose the information beyond the 
immediate requirements of the research. 11 87 
A public service solicitor went further, saying: 
"We don't accept the commission's view about 
conditions. We think it's too narrow. We have 
applied conditions in one situation where we don't 
think we would have grounds for withholding, and 
that is in relation to the disclosure of witnesses' 
names. We may be prosecuting an offender and the 
ofender's solicitor wants to have access to our 
prosecution file. In particular, the lawyer wants 
to know who our witnesses are going to be. We have 
said that we will give access to the prosecution 
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file and give the names of the witnesses we are 
going to call, on condition that when and if those 
witnesses are interviewed by the defence solicitor 
one of our senior officers is present. Initially, 
when we laid down that rule we also included a 
requirement that if the solicitor took any statement 
he should give a copy of that to us. This was 
objected to by solici tars in Auckland so we have 
dropped that part of it, but so far we have had no 
strong objection to the principal condition. 1188 
5.4.5 Assuming that the section does assume a power to impose 
conditions, the question of motive or use of information does 
become relevant. The proper interpretation of Section 28(1) (c) 
is a matter which has yet to be settled. The point of Section 
s. 4 of this paper, however, is that background and context can 
never be divorced totally from any decision under the Act. As 
was said in the case of medical information: 
"I am not suggesting that simple medical information 
should be kept from the patient by using whatever 
means exists under the Act. But I am suggesting 
that such information must be provided in a way that 
ensures the recipient understands its proper 
meaning. 1189 
5. 4. 6 On the other hand, there is as noted be fore, a need to observe 
the criteria provided by the Act and not to rely on instinct. As 
Mr Baragwanath commented: 
"One informed observer has expressed the opinion -
'... that many decisions as to whether or not 
to release information are based on sheer 
perception and then justified by resort to 
whatever section in the Act seems to provide 
the greatest support for a conclusion which has 
already been reached'. 
Practices of this kind! if not exposed and 
resisted, acquire a spurious legitimacy. 1190 
Nor is this a uniquely New Zealand phenomenon, a commentator on 
the Australian experience says: 
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"Prior to the Act's introduction certain senior 
officials were saying the government of the day did 
not understand the consequences of such legisla-
tion. These of Ficials seemed to see it as their 
role to protect the government from itself. 1-bw 
this arrogant attitude is expressed when it comes to 
deciding the application of particular exemptions. 
The application of exemptions is approached on the 
basis of what the applicant is perceived to want the 
information for, and not on whether the harm the 
exemption is intended to prevent can reasonably be 
expected to occur." 
No doubt this Australian view concerns what is mainly a temporary 
problem which will slowly dissolve as the new Act is more widely 
accepted. Certainly there is no evidence to suggest such a view 
is widely held in New Zealand. 
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6. THE MINISTER 
6.1 I now turn to look at the Minister's role on its own. Like the 
Ombudsman, the Minister appears to have a quasi-judicial function 
in deciding whether or not to veto a recommendation. There are 
three cases which illustrate this quite well. Reference must 
also be made again to the School Computers case. The question 
must be asked whether each of these vetoes complies entirely with 
the requirements of the Act and of natural justice. There has 
been some criticism of the fact that the Act gives the ministers 
a veto power. Minister's use of the veto may have been 
influenced by an unjustified fear of the effect the Act might 
have. However, it must be remembered that ultimately it is the 
Minister who takes political responsibility - he is elected, the 
Ombudsman and public servants are not. Is an entrenched public 
official in a better position to make judgements than a Minister 
answerable to the electorate? It must also be remembered that 
the Minister does not act at will in this area, but is subject to 
judicial cntrol if he oversteps the mark. 
6.2 Quasi-Judicial Nature of the Veto 
6. 2.1 Comment has already been made on the more judicial or quasi-
judicial character of the functions of the Ombudsman under the 
Act. The same is also true to some extent of the Minister. 
Because, in exercising his veto power, the Minister must consider 
the recommendation of the Ombudsman before deciding whether or 
not to veto it, and because any such decision must be made on the 
basis of the criteria given in the Act, the Minister is 
necessarily involved in an exercise of a quasi-judicial nature. 
This is nothing new. Ministers have many powers under statute to 
make and amend regulations and the like and to make decisions in 
individual cases. In doing so Ministers tend to rely on 
departmental advice. The same is true of decisions under the Act 
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- with some exceptions ministerial vetos are usually stated to be 
based on specific departmental advice. 
6.2 .2 A typical example of the type of ministerial veto statement which 
is most common, is that given in "National Alphabetical Electoral 
92 Listing" case. The veto was issued jointly by the then 
Postmaster-General and the then Minister of Justice. They listed 
three grounds: first that the Act was subject to the provisions 
of the Electoral Act 1956 which governed distribution of 
electoral rolls; second that the information on the rolls is 
personal information; third that the request required production 
of information not otherwise publicly available. Like most veto 
statements, this one was fairly brief. Whereas the Ombudsman's 
recommendations often run to many pages and contain in-depth 
consideration of issues and legal authorities, the veto 
statements seldom exceed one page in length and are often little 
more than bald assertions of fact or conclusion with only cursory 
references to the relevant section of the Act. 
6.2.3 By way of contrast, in the Reserve Bank case referred to 
previously, the then Prime Minister issued a two page statement 
indicating that he did not propose to veto the Ombudsman's 
recommendation but also criticising the Ombudsman's recommenda-
tion. The statement, by contrast to the "officialese" in which 
most veto statements are written, is couched in Sir Robert 
Muldoon' s own inimitable sty le. He first quotes from an address 
he made in Parliament, the second paragraph of which reads: 
"I do not know which officer of the Reserve Bank 
wrote the comment in the Reserve Bank Bulletin that 
was reported in last Saturday's "Evening Post" under 
the heading "R. B. Gives Warning" but I have already 
told the Governor of the Reserve Bank that the 
officer would be better employed in getting out some 
of the reports that I have been waiting for than in 
writing that fatuous nonsense. 11 93 
Sir Robert eventually concluded: 
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"While on this occasion I am prepared to agree to 
the decision of the Ombudsman being carried out, it 
nevertheless, as the Reserve Bank Directors pointed 
out, breaches the principle of confidentiality of 
advice, however the Ombudsman may choose to argue 
it; and whereas as leader of the Government which 
introduced and passed the Official Information Act 
1982 I would be reluctant to override a decision of 
the Ombudsman as provided for in the Act, I consider 
that as a general rule the confidentiality of 
departmental advice is more important than the 
curiosity of journalists, and on a future occasion 
my decision is likely to be different. 1194 
6.2.4 While Ministerial vetoes to date have not been subject to 
challenge on purely legal grounds (there has of course been 
criticism on political grounds), it is worth considering whether 
the vetoes do in fact comply with the requirements of Section 
32(4) of the Act. Section 32(4)(b) requires the Minister to 
state the "grounds" for the veto. The current edition of the 
Oxford Concise Dictionary gives one of the definitions of grounds 
as "Base, foundation, motive, valid reason". As I have mentioned 
above, most vetoes to date have been conspicuous by the almost 
total absence of reasoning. Usually, the veto simply paraphrases 
briefly the terms of the Act, with sometimes mention being made 
of unsupported assumptions of fact. The veto statements are 
invariably short and lacking in detailed argument. 
submit that each veto statement should: 
I would 
(a) Specifically state which sections of the Act are 
relied upon; 
(b) set out any matters of fact which are relevant; 
(c) explain the reasoning which lead to the veto being 
applied. 
6. 2. 5 If the vet o statement does not set out these matters as far as 
they are relevant, it can be said that the Minister has not 
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stated "the grounds" for the veto. Judicial review is, of 
course, available to require a Minister to comply with Section 
32(4)(b) and to specify the grounds. Moreover, there will always 
be the power to apply to the court for judicial review on the 
ground that the veto statement discloses an "error of law on the 
face of the record" or that the decision was one which the 
Minister could not reasonably have reached in the circumstances. 
The very brevity of some veto statements can be seen as an 
attempt not to set out the Minister's reasoning in sufficient 
detail so that it will be very difficult to claim before the 
courts that there is an error of law, for example. 
6.2.6 A very recent example appears in the New Zealand Gazette of 14 
June 1984. The then Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr 
Templeton, issued a veto to the Development Finance Corporation. 
The request had been for "a general outline of the Corporation's 
proposal to set up an investment bank". The veto consists of 
four relatively short paragraphs. The first paragraph sets out 
what was requested and directs it is not to be made available. 
The second summarises the Ombudsman's view under Section 
9(2) (g) (i) and then asserts a contrary opinion, simply repeating 
verbatim most of the words of the section. The third paragraph 
is longer. This sets out the background and at least summarises 
the reasoning leading to the Minister's veto. Some attempt is 
made to state why the Minister believes the words of the section 
apply to this case - this is what the "grounds" of a decision 
are. rbwever, there is still an apparent belief that the words 
of the relevant section need only be repeated like some ritual 
formula. 
6. 2. 7 What I think Ministers must learn to do is to take time to set 
out the "grounds" at length so that it can be seen that the 
Minister has understood the law correctly and that the decision 
is reasonably made in the circumstances. Since the Act by 
Section 34 clearly recognises that judicial review may be 
obtained, the obvious reason for providing in Section 32(4) (b) 
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that "grounds" must be stated is to ensure that the courts can 
review matters such as errors of law or unreasoinable decisions. 
This is only possible if the grounds of the veto are set out in 
full. If this is not done then the requester must have the right 
to ask the courts to compel the Minister to set out his reasons 
more fully. 
6.2.8 The final paragraph of Mr Templeton's veto simply reads: "4. 
This direction is not based on any advice". The question of the 
duty to consider the views of interested parties arises later in 
this paper. 1-bwever, it is strange that here, as in the School 
Computers case, the Minister has disclaimed the receipt of any 
advice. Surely the veto must be less likely to be challenged on 
legal grounds if based on detailed advice as to the law and the 
facts pertinent to the issue. Perhaps this simply illustrates 
that some Ministers have not yet realised that the veto cannot be 
exercised simply at will, and that there are external constraints 
on the use of the veto. 
6.2.9 It is also worth giving consideration again at this point to the 
Minister's veto in the School Computers case. The Minister there 
issued his veto on different grounds from those on which the 
department and the Ombudsman based their conclusions. It could 
be argued that natural justice requires that the Minister at 
least permit the requester and the department to give their views 
of the new grounds raised by the Minister. The requirements of 
natural justice vary according to the nature of the case, 95 but 
it is clear that the requester at least must have a right to 
advance his case in the face of a new and previously unexpected 
line of argument. 
6.3 PUblicised Criticism of the Veto 
6.3.1 The Ministerial veto powers are one aspect of the Act which has 
come in for some criticism. Mr Baragwanath has said: 96 
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"The Ombudsman is Parliament's officer and the 
public watchdog. For him to be overruled by a 
member of the Executive whose accountability is the 
major purpose of the Act is a matter of grave public 
concern." 
Mr Baragwanath' s comments have also made the front page of the 
newspapers. One such newspaper report commences: 
"Cost is deterring people from challenging 
ministerial veto of release of information under the 
Official Information Act, Auckland Queen's counsel 
David Baragwanath said yesterday. 1197 
6.3.2 The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Palmer, is also on record as 
criticising the use of Ministerial veto under the Act. The 
possibility of the new Government amending the Act will be 
discussed later. Prior to entering polities Mr Palmer wrote a 
book called "Lhbridled Power". In it he criticised the Danks 
Committee (which was then still working on its report) as 
unlikely to produce a radical reform. 98 Mr Palmer in his book 
suggested a "code of practice". The Danks Committee in its 
report and draft Bill went much further than the code of practice 
would have. Mr Palmer has since criticised the ministerial veto 
powers contained in the Act, which he now appears to believe did 
not go far enough in giving rights to obtain information. He can 
therefore be expected to push for a more radical amendment to the 
Act to replace the ministerial veto. 
6.4 Some Reasons for Ministerial caution 
6.4.l By way of reply to this public criticism of the apparent abuse of 
the ministerial veto, it can be said that the Act is still new 
and it should not be expected that attitudes and prejudices will 
disappear immediately. As the Danks Committee said: 
"We are also of the view that the principle should 
be applied progressively and with proper account 
being taken of practical considerations. An attempt 
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at a sudden and definitive reform could easily 
fail. 1199 
6.4.2 It should also be borne in mind that prior to the Act coming into 
force, there were some apprehensions that the floodgates were 
about to be opened and officials deluged in requests for 
information. This fear was reinforced by observers of the 
American experience. One New Zealand permanent head commented of 
the US situation: 100 
"In a visit to the FDA in April of this year, I took 
the opportunity to discuss the freedom of informa-
tion legislation and practise. I learned that the 
budget for these activites has reached $4m per 
annum. I also learned that all the FDA' s work in 
this field was to be undertaken by existing staff, 
which sounds familiar. rbwever, · this proved to be 
impossible (which may also sound familiar), and now 
each bureau in the FDA has a staff of two or three 
to carry out this work. They deal mainly with the 
administrative procedures, being able to process 
only a minority of requests themselves, most of 
which have to be referred to professional or 
technical staff. 
I believe this is a picture of the abuse of freedom 
of information, and trust we may be spared such a 
result in this country." 
6.4.3 Given such apprehension, it was with some relief that most 
departments discovered that the Danks Committee had not secretly 
been saying "Apres moi, le deluge. " Perhaps closer to the New 
Zealand situation was the Australian experience: 
"The dire predictions of floods of FOI requests did 
not eventuate. The Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
Department, for example, which predicted more than 
100,000 requests per year had received at the end of 
seven months a total of 448 requests. It must also 
be said, however, that a number of the requests 
received by many agencies have been far from 
routine. 11101 
6.4.4 By and large, departments have not perceived any drastic inc~ease 
in workloads as a result of the Act. The main exceptions are the 
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Treasury, which has had to take on some extra temporary staff,
102 
and the Education Department, which has had a flood of requests 
for examination papers. 
6.5 The Political Argument 
6.5.l Finally on the subject of the Minister's role, it should be said 
that one reason that the Act was able to be framed in such broad 
terms, is that some control was still left with the Minister. If 
the members of the executive branch of government had not felt 
that sufficient powers of control were still reposed in them, 
they might not have been willing to support the Act or they might 
have attempted to have it "watered down". 
6.5.2 The Danks Committee accepted that Parliamentary control of 
Ministers in the sense of the ability to dismiss Ministers for 
mistakes made, has little practical significance in the present 
New Zealand parliamentary system. f-bwever the committee believed 
that: 
"2 .10 A Minister is and remains answerable in a 
way no one else can be. He is elected to 
Parliament under a system where the party 
having the greatest number of seats in 
Parliament habitually forms the Government -
it is unreal to suggest that New Zealand 
voters simply elect members and not 
Governments - and must submit himself to 
re-election every three years. Judges and 
Ombudsmen are neither elected by nor are 
they accountable to the people. 
"2.11 A Minister is liable to be questioned in 
Parliament about the administration of his 
department and he must respond to ·criti-
cism. In shortd he must defend himself in a 
public forum. 111 3 
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6.6 Judicial Control 
6.6.1 As mentioned previously, there is also the further control of the 
minister by the judiciary. This control is, of course, limited 
to matters which can be considered on judicial review. While the 
powers of the Minister (and for that matter those of the 
officials and of the Ombudsman) are not to be exercised 
arbitrarily but in accordance with the terms of the Act, 
nevertheless the courts have consistently shrunk from attempting 
to substitute their own views for those of the executive - at 
least in regard to matters within the competence of the executive. 
The Danks Committee referred to legal authority on this 
point. ThJt.~4 are three main grounds on which the decision 
of the Minister might be challenged: 
(1) The Minister has not observed the criteria in the 
Act, or has not followed the procedure laid down. 
( 2) The Minister has erred in law - i.e. has misunder-
stood the Act. 
( 3) The Minister has acted on an improper motive - he 
has allowed himself to be influenced by matters 
which the Act does not accept as relevant. 
6.6.2 This last point is of some interest and is worthy of note. One 
of the leading cases in this area is Padfield v. Minister of 
Agriculture. 105 The Minister had a power to set up a commit tee 
to investigate a speci fie complaint. I-le refused to do so when 
requested and gave as one of his grounds that the committee might 
make recommendations which he would not be prepared to comply 
with. The House of Lords ruled that this was improper. The 
Minister in considering an improper motive had not exercised his 
discretion properly. His decision was therefore invalid. 
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6.6.3 It is clear therefore that matters such as the potential 
political embarrassment of the Minister cannot be taken into 
account by the Minister. The problem, as always in cases such as 
Padfield is that not all ministers are so obliging as to admit 
frankly the true reasons for making a decision. It is always 
open to a minister, having based his decision on spurious 
motives, to make no mention of such motives and to justify the 
decision on other grounds which are acceptable. It is for this 
reason that a full and adequate statement by the Minister of the 
grounds for the veto is necessary. To some extent the problem 
can be overcome by use of the "discovery" process in court. 106 
The Official In formation Act has also helped to open up this 
process .107 Despite that however, the attitudes of ministers, 
like all other actors in this scenario, are all important. As 
the Danks Committee said: 
"The will to change must inform the working of the 
system if it is to promote the evolution of 
attitutdes and practice. This applies to all 
concerned - ministers, parliamentarians, officials, 
public interest groups, and the public media. But 
the initiative rests primarily with ministers and 
the public media. 11108 
7. 
7.1 
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THE OMBUDSMAN 
I now turn to look at the Ombudsman's role. Because the 
decisions under the Act have required him to consider and decide 
on the basis of legal authorities, and to rule on the application 
of the constitutional conventions, the Ombudsman has been drawn 
into decisions of a judicial character. This may afect the 
status of the Ombudsman. The Act now means the Ombudsman is more 
likely to be the subject of judicial review, although I would 
suggest the courts will use their powers sparingly. Finally, it 
is interesting to note some contrasts with the Ombudsman Act -
these may indicate the manner in which the Ombudsman's role is 
likely to develop as a result of the Official Information Act. 
In this regard, I would mention jurisdiction over local 
authorities, the need to notify a person before making adverse 
comment about that person, and the cases concerning the interests 
of third parties. 
7.2 Comparison with the Onbudsmen Act 
7.2.1 As stated the Act has resulted in an expansion of the Ombudsman's 
functions. This is partly a result of the fact that the Act is 
intended to create legal rights to information. It is also in 
part the result of the fact that Section 32 of the Act creates a 
public duty to observe the Ombudsman's recommendation unless a 
Ministerial veto is issued. 
7.2.2 It should be noted that by contrast with the Official Information 
Act, the Ombudsmen Act 1975 creates no duty to observe the 
Ombudsman's recommendations. The Ombudsmen Act relies on the 
threat of publicity (principally reports to Parliament and the 
Prime Minister) .109 Also it should be noted the Ombudsmen Act 
prohibits judicial review of the Ombudsman's activities - except 
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. llO lhtil the advent of 
the Official Information Act the main point of contact between 
• 
I 
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the Ombudsman and the Courts arose under Section 13(9) of the 
Dnbudsmen Act which permitted the Ombudsman to apply for a 
Declaratory Judgment as to his right to investigate a matter. In 
practise most instances in other countries (such as Canada and 
Australia) where the extent of the Ombudsman's authority has been 
called into question, have resulted from the Ombudsman's applying 
to the Court to determine whether he has authority to investigate 
a particular matter. 111 
7.2.3 While there is a new dimension to the Ombudsman's role under the 
Official Information Act, nevertheless much of what the Ombudsman 
does under the new Act is a continuation of his role under the 
Ombudsmen Act. The Chief Ombudsman has said that he has always 
investigated complaints of a like nature to those arising under 
the Official Information Act. 112 Many of the Ombudsman's 
recommendations under the Act do simply involve him in this 
familiar role in investigating the administrative actions and 
decisions and making his recommendations as to their correctness. 
7.2.4 That does not, however, deny the new characteristics of the 
Ombudsman's role. Throughout his Casenotes on the Act, there is 
regular reference to legal authorities. For instance, in a case 
concerning personal information held by the Rural Bank, 113 the 
Ombudsman was faced with a claim that the Act did not apply to 
information supplied before the commencement of the Act. The 
Ombudsman in rejecting this claim, became involved in questions 
of statutory interpretation and referred to legal texts on the 
subject .114 Other such cases involved medical reports obtained 
by the War Pensions Board.115 It was argued that the War 
Pensions Regulations (Regulation 3(5)) prohibited release of the 
reports. The validity of the regulations then came into 
question. The Ombudsman found that by one reading the regula-
tions were valid but did not prevent release, whereas by another 
reading, the regulations prohibited release but were invalid. He 
determined in favour of the former interpretation. In doing so 
he referred to three legal principles: 
[!Sl [iB:Jrt 
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(1) An absurd or unjust meaning should be avoided if 
another meaning is possible. 
(2) Exceptions in the Act to the principles of 
availability of information, must be read narrowly. 
(3) If, of two possible interpretations, one would lead 
to the provision being held invalid, then the other 
is to be preferred. 
7.3 The Constitutional Conventions 
7.3.l The other interesting new role the Ombudsman is given by the Act 
is that of arbiter of the Constitutional Conventions - or at 
least the four conventions mentioned in Section 9 (2) ( f) and the 
conventions protecting expression of opinion to the extent they 
are embodied in Section 9(2)(g). This role he, of course, shares 
with Ministers and to some extent the officials. To date, 
however, the most detailed consideration given to exactly what 
the conventions are and what they provide for has come from the 
Ombudsman. Since by definition the conventions have not 
generally been justiciable, the courts have seldom been called 
upon to consider in greater depth the conventions. Eventually 
the courts may be asked to consider the constitutional conven-
tions as a result of an application for judicial review arising 
under the Act. In the meantime, however, we must rely on the 
Ombudsman's ruling on the conventions. 
7.3.2 The Chief Ombudsman's views on these conventions are perhaps best 
set out in the following comment: 
"ltlw, I don't know whether anyone can tell me what 
the constitutional convention is; I don't know 
whether anyone has addressed themselves to it. The 
immediate answer would probably be that we have a 
Westminster-type system of government, and these 
conventions are inherent in it. But what are the 
essentials of a Westminster-type government? I 
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could tell you, because I took the trouble to look 
them up. It seems to me that we are going to have 
to look closely at the extent to which what we 
understand in general and vague terms to be 
constitutional conventions are in fact operating 
constitutional conventions now. It may be that the 
virginity of some of them has been impaired, for 
example, by the operations of my office over the 
past twenty years, because I have never been 
confronted with the proposition that because it 
would breach a constitutional convention I may not 
make available to a coi')Dlainant the nature of advice 
given to a minister."! 6 
7.4 Judicial Review 
7.4.l The Act clearly contemplates that a recommendation of the 
Ombudsman may be the subject for an application for judicial 
review. Given the nature of the public duties which may arise 
under the Act and that matters of law have been prominent in a 
number of decisions under the Act, some governmental agencies may 
consider it desirable that applications for judicial review be 
used as a means of resolving some issues. kl application to the 
court in many cases will have the advantage of giving a 
definitive ruling on questions that are likely to arise regularly. 
7.4.2 Of course, the Ombudsman has previously been subject to some 
degree of judicial control. The relationship between the courts 
and the Ombudsman is summed up in the following cowment: 
"flr'ld yet ... the growing willingness of the 
Courts to reassert and widen their traditional 
authority to control public power has been 
widely - if not unanimously - welcomed: the 
insistence on procedural fairness, on allowing 
litigants access to official information 
relevant to their litigation, on the unlawful 
use of discretions by Ministers and local 
authorities and on lawmakers and tribunals 
staying within the law. Why should the 
Ombudsmen be seen differently? It is not 
really suggested they should be.. . But there 
are several important features of the law 
relating to the Ombudsmen that suggest judicial 
caution. One is that they can, in the end 'do 
7.4.3 
-
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no more than recommend or comment' . A second 
is that they are control agencies rather than 
themselves the direct melders of public power. 
A third is that the statutes confer the powers 
in broad non-technical terms, with flexible 
procedures to match."ll7 
The first of these features does not always apply under the 
Official Information Act: the Ombudsman's view may become 
binding if no veto is issued. The other two of these features 
however do apply and for these reasons it must be clear that the 
courts will exercise the power to review the Ombudsman's 
"recommendations" sparingly. 
As noted previously, there has until now been little room for 
judicial review of the Ombudsman's recommendations. Nor were 
there likely to be many occasions on which a judicial review 
would be desired given the non-binding character of the 
Ombudsman's recommendations. In theory one would have expected 
the more common sitution under the Official Information Act to be 
that a requester would seek judicial review of a minister's 
veto. Despite the questionable manner in which the veto has been 
exercised in some cases (averted to previously) there have been 
no applications for judicial review of a veto - perhaps because 
the requester thinks the expense is not worthwhile, or in some 
cases are not aware of the possibilities for review. The only 
application for review so far was that commenced by the police in 
the briefs of evidence case. "Quangos" and Government Depart-
ments are less likely to be detered by cost and may consider an 
application for judicial review more readily, than private 
requesters. If, however, judicial review of the Ombudsman's 
recommendations becomes more common, this may affect the 
Ombudsman's status. If judicial review of his recommendations is 
regarded by the public in general as simply another form of 
appeal to a higher court, then the Ombudsman will come to be 
regarded as simply another judicial officer - of inferior status 
to High Court judges. Care needs to be taken to ensure that the 
unique character and standing of the Ombudsman is preserved. 
---• 
1111 
----., 
- 57 -
7.5 Comparisons Between the Onbudsman and the Courts 
7.5.1 Another difficulty arising for the Ombudsman in his expanded role 
is that, while many of the issues which he may face have 
similarities to those decided by courts, he does not have all the 
advantages enjoyed by the courts. When a case comes before a 
court, each party will usually have counsel to represent that 
party's interests. Counsel will be able to research the relevant 
legal authorities, and present the facts and the law in a 
coherent fashion. When the Ombudsman reviews a decision to 
withhold information, he will often have only the departmental 
case put before him. Many requesters will not have the resources 
to research and present their case to the best advantage. Legal 
aid is not available for requests under the Official Information 
Act. The Ombudsman, therefore, may well, in an attempt to 
achieve a balance, lean heavily against the department. Judges 
have over the years learnt to deal as fairly as they can with 
cases where one party is not legally represented. The Ombudsman 
will also need to develop this skill. 
7.5.2 I have also mentioned in regard to the cases on legal profes-
sional privilege, that the Ombudsman's view of the ·law on 
privilege must be consistent with the views expressed by the 
courts. The Ombudsman for much of his researches of legal 
matters must rely on the resources of his office, which is under 
118 some pressure as a result of the Act. 
7.6 Local Government 
7.6.l There are some further interesting contrasts between the Official 
Information Act and the Ombudsmen Act. Each has a schedule 
setting out the institutions to which the Act is to apply. 
Different er iter ia were believed to be applicable to Official 
Information and accordingly the schedule to the Act differs in 
some instances from the Schedule to the Ombudsmen Act. Most 
7.6.2 
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notably however, local government is generally exempt from the 
Official Information Act. The Danks Committee explained: 
"Pmong the factors suggesting the exclusion of an 
organisation are that it is more concerned with 
local government than with central government, has 
large areas of autonomy from central government in 
its composition, the source of its funds and the 
fixing of priorities, their use, the making of its 
decisions and the carrying out of its functions. 
Accordingly the schedule does not include 
bodies with essentially local functions (many of 
them are already subject to the Public Bodies 
Meetings Act 1962) or tribunals, including tribunals 
concerned with the registration and discipline of 
members of a profession or occupational group. 11119 
It is to be remembered that the Ombudsman originally did not have 
any jurisdiction over local government. This was a later 
extension of his functions. Possibly the Official Information 
Act may be extended into this area also, once the principles and 
practise of the new Act have become settled. Certainly, I can 
see no reason in principle why local bodies should not have the 
principles of open government applied to them. As noted 
previously, the Ombudsmen Act has allowed the Ombudsman to make 
public information previously kept confidential by central 
government - the same is doubtless true of local government. 
7.7 Third Parties 
7.7.l Further interesting comparisons can be made between the two 
Pets. Section 22(7) of the Ombudsmen Act requires the Ombudsman 
to give a right of hearing before making public any recommenda-
tion which contains criticism of any individual. This is of 
course a reflection of the long-recognised principle of natural 
justice: audi al teram partem. The Official Information Act does 
not contain such a provision. However by virtue of Section 29 of 
the act, Section 22(7) of the Ombudsmen Act appears to apply to 
investigations under the Official Information Act. So the 
Ombudsman is still required, before making a recommendation under 
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the Official Information Act in which criticism is made of a 
person, to give that person a right to "put his case". 
7.7.2 Secondly, the Ombudsmen Act prohibits judicial review of the 
Ombudsmen' s recommendations. The Official Information Act 
tacitly accepts that there is a right to judicial review of 
decisions. Since Section 32 creates a public duty to observe an 
Ombudsman's "recommendation" unless vetoed, a recommendation must 
be treated as a decision for this purpose. Those aggrieved by an 
adverse comment in the Ombudsman's recommendation can apply to 
the High Court in appropriate cases. 
7. 7 .3 There are other instances in which a "third party" may wish to 
have his objections to release of information considered by the 
Ombudsman. Again the Official Information Act by Section 29 
brings in the provisions of the Ombudsman Act to give these 
parties rights to be heard by the Ombudsman. In addition the 
right to judicial review may be relied on. The Danks Committee 
believed this would be sufficient to cover such cases as what is 
known as "reverse freedom of information" (a party arguing 
against release) or an individual wishing to prevent release in 
order to protect his privacy .
120 The committee did not wish to 
make the process more formal as it said: 
"It is known to be the Ombudsmen's practice to 
consult any third parties who might appear to be 
affected before making any recommendation, and this 
practice would doubtless extend to applications 
arising under the information legislation. 
Departments and organisations might also be expected 
to consult where appropriate . A statutory scheme 
however would tend to be complex and rigid and raise 
questions of the validity of decisions to disclose 
information. 11121 
7. 7. 4 Some of the cases covered in the Ombudsman's Case Notes involve 
these situations. 
before. 122 There 
public servants, 
personal details 
The "Stud 
the third 
some of whom 
such as date 
Book" case has been mentioned 
parties were some thousands of 
might be expected to object to 
of birth and salary being made 
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public. In the circumstances their interests could only be 
represented by the Public Service Association. Thus we had the 
interesting situation of an organisation which had previously 
welcomed the new Act, arguing against release of information at a 
time when the Act had not long been in force. 
7. 7. 5 Another such case arose from a request for a copy of the report 
of an internal enquiry into the "That's Country" affair in 
TVNZ. 123 In considering the issues of personal privacy 
involved the Ombudsman was scrupulous not to mention those 
involved. Thus he refers to the following categories: 
" (a) A named person's activity which was of the 
same nature as that already publicised; 
(b) A named person's activity in a different area 
from that which had been publicised but of the 
same nature as that publicised about- others. 
(c) An unpublished person's evidence which related 
to a publicised person's activity in a 
publicised area. 11124 
And so on through to category (e). The Ombudsman later expands 
on category (b), referring to the participants as X, Y and Z. 
l'tlne of this makes the report easy to read or understand. 
f-bwever it does illustrate the Ombudsman's commitment to 
preservation of personal privacy. He ultimately recommended 
release of information in categories (a) and (b) above and 
withholding (c) to (e); however he at no stage named those 
involved even in (a) and (b). 
7. 7. 6 A third case involved the Rural Bank . 125 The Bank had been 
advised that a sharemilker 's contract had been terminated. The 
sharemilker requested the identity of the informant and the 
information supplied by the informant. This type of case is an 
important one. It is a situation which can and will arise in a 
number of departments such as Social We! fare and the f-busing 
Corporation. On the one hand there is the need of the Department 
to know if recipients of assistance from the State are abusing 
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the system by obtaining assistance they are not entitled to. 
These Departments see a need to assure informants that the advice 
is treated "in confidence", otherwise neighbours and others most 
likely to have this information will probably not supply the 
information. On the other hand there is the right of the 
individual to know who is damaging that person's reputation. 
This is particularly so if the informant is biased or untruthful. 
7. 7. 7 In terms of the Act the Ombudsman first faced the question of 
whether the request was for personal information or not. If it 
was not, then Section 9(2) (b) permitted the withholding of the 
information. If it was personal information, then Section 
27(l)(c) permitted the withholding of the information only if it 
was "evaluative material". The Ombudsman ruled it was personal 
information and was not evaluative material. re recommended that 
the Bank reconsider its decision accordingly. In that case the 
rights of the third party (the informant) were not considered 
very carefully. In part, this must result from the terms of the 
Act which does clearly favour release of personal information to 
the person concerned. f-bwever, the views of the informant might 
surely have been considered. Was the informant even aware that 
disclosure of his information had been requested? 
7.7.8 A similar thing happened in the "Computers in Schools" Case. The 
suppliers of the information were not given any opportunity to 
put their viewpoint or even to say whether the information was 
supplied in confidence as far as they knew. It seems to me that 
the Ombudsman has not fulfilled the expectations of the Danks 
Committee in this regard. The procedure required by Section 
22(7) of the Ombudsmen Act is not of much assistance in such a 
case. That subsection only requires the Ombudsman to give a 
person a hearing before making a comment "adverse" to that person. 
7. 7. 9 In the cases under discussion, there was no adverse "comment". 
f-bwever the informant was nonetheless likely to be adversel y 
affected by the Ombudsman's recommendations. The procedure for 
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judicial review may be of some assistance in such cases. f-bwever 
the applicability of the rules of natural justice are not fixed 
and rigid - the requirements of natural justice will vary 
according to the nature of the case. 126 Whether the rule "audi 
alteram partem" should apply to every investigation by the 
Ombudsman under the Official Information Act, remains to be 
seen. Also it must be remembered that different people will have 
different views as to what the requirements of natural justice 
are. The same can be said of natural justice as was said of the 
idea of natural law - "like a harlot the concept of natural law 
is at the disposal of everyone 11 • 127 
8. 
8.1 
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THE COURTS AND THE ACT 
I now come to consider the place of the courts in reference to 
the roles of Minister and Ombudsman under the Act. The courts, 
of course, may have a very specific role in enforcing (if it is 
ever necessary) the rights to personal information under the 
Act. I-ere, however, I am interested in the way in which the 
courts may control the actions of the Ombudsman and the 
Minister. For this reason the possibility of judicial review is 
of prime interest. Again, this gives rise to the question of 
third party rights. There is also the question of whether a 
defective decision under the Act may be cured by reconsideration, 
for example, by the Ombudsman. Finally, however, it must be said 
that there are conclusive reasons for relying on the Ombudsman, 
rather than the courts, to determine disputes under the Act. 
Therefore, while the courts have a role to play, it is largely 
confined to the matters that may arise on judicial review. It is 
not the role of the courts to act as a general appeal authority 
under the Act. 1-bwever, in some areas, such as third party 
questions, the attitude of the courts may prove important in the 
future. 
8.2 Judicial Review 
8.2.1 As previously mentioned the Act clearly contemplates judicial 
review of decisions under the Act. The Act did not need to 
specify that judicial review may arise in respect of decisions 
taken under the Act, since the courts will always assume that 
there is such a power unless a statute clearly states otherwise. 
1-bwever Section 34 of the Act provides that applications for 
judicial review and the like may only be made after the Ombudsman 
has investigated the matter. It is possible, but by no means 
certain that the courts would have required this in any 
event. 128 
- 64 -
8.2.2 As noted previously judicial review does not imply an open right 
of appeal to the courts or that a judge may substitute has 
opinion for that of the Ombudsman. Rather the courts will 
confine themselves to matters such "error of law on the face of 
the record" and whether the decision made was one which could not 
possibly have been made given the criteria set out in the Act. 
As the Danks Committee said: 
"In the result, the executive (and the Ombudsmen on 
review) will have a discretion in the sense of 
freedom to judge that in terms of the criteria a 
request for a document can justifiably be refused. 
The courts will decline to substitute their own 
judgment for that of officials, Ministers or 
Ombudsmen. f\onetheless, as courts have often 
insisted, a discretion of this kind is not 
arbitrary. flrl official will not be free to decline 
a request for access except on the grounds 
stated. 11129 
8.3 Third Party Rights Revisited 
8.3 .1 Again the point covered in Section 7. 7 of this paper arises. 
While the maxim "audi alteram partem" and Section 22(7) of the 
Ombudsmen Act may provide some assistance, it is far from clear 
whether the courts will be able to, or will think it right to, 
require that the views of third parties who may be affected 
should be considered by the Ombudsman, the Minister or the 
officials. The courts have been assiduous in requiring a right 
of hearing to be given in cases where an employee is to be 
dismissed. But do the same requirements exist in the case of an 
individual who might wish to argue against information supplied 
by him being released?130 The extent of the potential harm is 
usually much less, but conceivably in some cases real harm to an 
informant's business or reputation could result from release of 
the identity or business methods of the informant. 
8.3.2 The informant who wishes to argue that the information he has 
provided should not be released may have a good case under 
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Sections 9(2) (a) or (b) - that is to say that withholding the 
information is necessary to protect his privacy or that of 
others, or to protect information supplied in confidence. 
Equally the informant may be able to appeal to Part IV of the Act 
by claiming that some of the information is personal to him. 
8.3.3 There is also, of course the contrary argument, that information 
supplied since the passage of the Act must have been supplied in 
the knowledge that the information might be released under the 
Act. Very clear and specific evidence is needed therefore to 
show that the information was supplied in confidence. All these 
issues can be and are considered by the Ombudsman in considering 
such cases. Unfortunately, to date, those third parties who 
might have been able to support the consideration given to such 
factors by further factual evidence or more detailed submissions 
have not been able to do so. Instead, the Ombudsman can only 
refer to the case put by the department, which should properly 
take 2n independant stance in such cases. The department, like 
the Ombudsman at the second stage, must make a balanced judgement 
on whether the information should be released and not attempt 
simply to advance the case of the supplier of the information. 
8. 3. 4 I have already mentioned some of the instances in which the 
rights of third parties could have been relevant. These include 
the "School Computers" case, the Rural Banks request from a 
sharemilker and the "That's Country" affair. The other group of 
cases which may well arise, concern medical reports. Here is one 
doctor's comment: 
"The situation could arise, however, when the doctor 
is imprudent enough to be rather more frank than 
perhaps he or she ought to be in describing one or 
two of the patient's shortcomings. Whether or not 
the information the doctor provides is true is not 
the point, but with the advent of this Act it would 
be wise for a doctor in such circumstances to avoid 
including gratuitous comment. I well remember a 
senior colleague, now long dead, giving me a bit of 
advice when I began practice some years ago. f-le 
said: 'If you're reporting to anybody about one of 
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your own patients, if you cannot say something nice, 
then don't say anything at all'~ That is very wise 
counsel. 11131 
So once again, there is always the problem that if the Act is not 
seen to be working as expected, some of those involved simply 
will not generate the information they might have. 
8.4 can Reconsideration D.Jre Defective Decisions 
8.4.l The other possibility is that if there has been any defect in the 
original decision (such as a failure to consider or receive the 
submissions of a party who might be affected) the defect may be 
cured by adopting the correct procedure on any appeal. This 
might be the case where the irregularity was that of the 
department. The Ombudsman might be able to cure the defect. The 
same however could not be true of the Minister. As previously 
noted in Section 5. 2, the Minister's veto power is not essen-
tially another form of appeal. If a person is dissatisfied with 
the manner in which the Ombudsman exercised his jurisdiction, any 
irregularity cannot be said to be cured by the fact that the 
Minister did not decide to veto the Ombudsman's decision. 
8.4.2 Even the Ombudsman's action in adopting a correct procedure in an 
attempt to cure a defect in the departments' actions may not be 
sufficient, however. The Courts are not always prepared to 
accept such subsequent remedial action. 132 As Lord Reid said 
in Ridge v. Baldwin: 
"Finally, there is the question whether by appealing 
to the Secretary of State the appellant is in some 
way prevented from now asserting the nullity of the 
respondents' decision. A person may be prevented 
from asserting the truth by estoppel, but it is not 
seriously argued that that doctrine applies here. 
Then it is said that the appellant elected to go to 
the Secretary of State and thereby waived his right 
to come to the court. That appears to me to be an 
attempt to set up what is in effect estoppel where 
the essential elements for estoppel are not 
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present. There are many cases where two remedies 
are open to an aggrieved person, but there is no 
general rule that by going to some other tribunal he 
puts it out of his power thereafter to assert his 
rights in court; and there was no express waiver 
because in appealing to the Secretary of State the 
appellant reserved his rtqht to maintain that the 
decision was a nullity."13Y 
8.5 The Onbudsman or the Court 
8.5.1 The sometimes technical legal nature of the issues raised by many 
of the cases considered by the Ombudsman has, as already stated, 
made it likely (and in some cases desirable) that the procedure 
for judicial review will be used to clarify the legal issues 
involved. The factor which may promote a desire for judicial 
review in appropriate cases is the need for officials to have 
clear and recognised guidelines. Officials, it is said, when 
faced by a request for information would prefer to be able to 
make a decision on the basis of clear rules. 134 The courts, 
because of the rules of precedent, may be able to establish some 
set rules in interpreting the Act. 
8.5.2 The Danks Committee leaned heavily away from a rigid set of 
rules. The Act was to be a flexible and growing organism. Thus 
the committee said: 
"Under our proposals the judgments to be made about 
access have at least three significant characteris-
tics: they are to be made by reference to broad 
criteria which are to be weighed against the basic 
presumption of availability; they are to be made by 
reference to the particular circumstances of the 
area of administration in question; and they are to 
be made from time to time by reference to any 
relevant changes in circumstances."135 
The Ombudsman has adopted this approach. In the Rural Bank case 
he said: 
"In forming that opinion, in this particular case, I 
took account of the General Manager's concern at the 
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wider implications that could arise from it. 
1-owever, my opinion was con fined, as it must be, to 
the circumstances of this particular case. It did 
not establish a general principle about disclosing 
the identity of an informant. Equally, it was not 
appropriate for the Corporation to assert as a 
general principle with application to all requests, 
that the identity of an informant should not be made 
available. Each request for such information must 
be considered in the light of the Official 
Information Jlct. nl36 
8.5.3 I have commented earlier that officials and others may in some 
areas hope to obtain the sense of security provided by clear 
legal rulings and may therefore apply to the courts. However, 
given the flexibility of approach required by the Act, it is 
clear that it will not normally be appropriate for decisions 
under the act to be taken by the courts . Indeed they would 
decline to do so except in cases where the rules applicable on 
judicial review apply. While I have made some play in this paper 
of the quasi-judicial role of the Ombudsman under the Act, the 
processes envisaged by the Act are clearly more suited to the 
Ombudsman than to the Courts. The Act sets out broad er i ter ia 
for the availability of information and the protection of 
• important interests; it does not protect classes of documents or 
specific types of subject matter. 
8.5.4 In the case of official information (as opposed to personal 
information dealt with in Part IV of the Act) the absence in many 
cases of blanket protections or hard and fast rules may make it 
inappropriate to give the courts the final decision making 
power. That does not mean that the courts cannot be of 
considerable assistance in interpreting the Act, in giving 
guidance to the Ombudsman as to the extent of his authority under 
the Pet and in advising on matters of law such as legal 
professional privilege and even the Constitutional conventions. 
The Ombudsmen Pet contains provision for the Ombudsman to seek 
the opinion of the High Court in determining whether he has 
jurisdiction in individual cases. 137 It occurs to me that it 
would be convenient for the Ombudsman, or any minister or 
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requester, to ask for the court's opinion on any such legal 
matter. This could be done by way of case stated. The procedure 
for judicial review is available for such cases generally. 
f-lcwever, I would suggest that a case stated procedure could be 
more direct and less expensive. 
8.5.5 To date, the courts have not played a large role in the 
development of the Act. It is suggested they could usefully play 
a greater role in future. 1-bwever it must be said that there are 
distinct advantages to leaving the main power to review decisions 
to the Ombudsman. His procedure is informal. Those affected do 
not need legal representation (although, as mentioned, that may 
sometimes be a disadvantage). Most importantly the cost of 
review by the Ombudsman is much less than would be the case if 
review by the courts became the rule. This appears to be the 
major distinguishing factor between the New Zealand experience 
and the United States experience. 
~ 
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9. 
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FUTURE CHAN::iES 
I have already considered in this paper some of the future 
changes which may be expected if the Act continues in its present 
form. 1-k:Jwever, I now wish to consider, rather briefly, what may 
happen if the Act is amended. It may seem strange, a little over 
a year since the Act came into force, to talk of amendments, but 
the Labour Party, prior to the recent election did suggest that 
it would amend the Act to remove the Ministerial veto. The exact 
effect of this would depend on the manner in which this is done. 
The suggestion appears to be that the courts, rather than the 
Minister, should have the final word on release of official 
in formtion. 
9 .2 At one extreme the amendment could effectively give the courts 
the same wide-ranging power to consider all the matters which Act 
makes relevant and to substitute the courts opinion on all 
matters for that of the officials and the Ombudsman. This could 
involve the courts having to consider whether there is any 
countervailing public interest in favour of releasing information 
under Section 9(1). Similarly, the courts would have to 
consider, for the purposes of Sections 6 ·and 7, whether release 
of the information would prejudice security or harm the economy 
and such like matters. This runs quite contrary to the trend in 
judicial thinking as evidenced in the closely analogous area of 
public interest immunity. The courts will not always accept the 
claim by the executive that certain documents must be withheld in 
the public interest - the courts do check the documents to 
ascertain whether the public interest really requires this. 
rbwever, in matters such as security the courts are far less 
willing to attempt to substitute their own views for those of the 
executive. 
9.3 At the other extreme there is the possibility that the Act as 
amended could effectively make the Ombudsman's recommendation 
binding. If there is no veto power, then the recommendation 
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creates a "public duty" in all cases. The only way to attempt to 
have the Ombudsman overruled would be to apply for a judicial 
review. As noted above, the courts do not have complete power to 
reconsider a decision on judicial review. As a result of 
judicial activism, the scope of judicial review is wide, but the 
courts do not attempt to substitute their views - particularly in 
matters of discretion. Judicial review must be based on some 
specific ground such as error of law on the record, or a perverse 
finding of fact or a failure to follow the requirements of the 
Pet. 
One result of such a change would be to place greater emphasis 
than ever on the Ombudsman's role. If he has the final say in 
most cases, the public perception of his office must change. The 
Ombudsman may be seen as simply another administrative tribunal. 
If that is so, there may be pressure to provide for a form of 
appeal from the Ombudsman's recommendations, which could be 
extended to cover recommendations under the Ombudsmen Act. This 
would involve matters of policy and the like which, I think, 
should remain the province of the executive . 
Of course, it is possible that the Act as amended could take some 
middle course. There could be an independent commissioner or 
tribunal to reconsider the Ombudsman's recommenation. Any system 
of justice must recognise that an individual arbitrator may 
occasionally err. That is why in most systems some form of 
appellate body is established. There are of course objections to 
this in the case of the Ombudsman. re should not be seen as 
another form of judge who can be overruled by a higher court. 
Under the Ombudsmen Act this does not arise since the recommenda-
tions are not binding. 
There are other precedents for establishing a separate Commis-
sioner. The Danks Committee, in its comments on Part IV of the 
draft bill referred to the precedent set by the Wanganui Computer 
Centre Act 1976. 138 The Wanganui Computer Centre Privacy 
•• 
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Commissioner fulfills functions similar to those of the Onbudsman 
under the Official Information Act. There has also been 
criticism that the Ombudsman's role under the Act involves him in 
more contentious cases where confrontation with the executive is 
likely to 
office.139 
lead to the "politicisation" of the Ombudsman's 
If that is so, and personally I doubt it, then the 
answer could be to establish a separate Commissioner to exercise 
the powers presently given to the Ombudsman under the Act. 
9.5 There are, of course, many other possible solutions. For 
instance there could be an Official Information Commissioner 
whose decision can be reviewed by the Ombudsman. I think both 
the present political realities and the general climate of public 
opinion (to the extent there is any public opinion on such 
matters) make it inevitable that the ministerial veto must be 
abolished. I suggest it is desirable that the Ombudsman's 
recommendation should not be final as that would do considerable 
violence to the Ombudsman's role as it has previously been 
developed. There might be some merit in accepting the High Court 
as the review authority. The courts have shown an increasing 
capacity to handle discretionary powers. Ultimately however it 
is not desirable for the courts to be drawn too heavily into an 
area such as this which involves policy and (at times) politics 
and requires to be handled with a high degree of flexibility and 
informality. 
9.6 So I suppose we could do what we always do when faced by an 
administrative prblem with quasi-judicial ramifications - we 
compromise and set up an "independent" tribunal. As always, I 
suppose, the chairman would be a judge or at least a lawyer and 
one member would have close links with the executive. Section 32 
would then provide that there is a public duty to observe the 
Ombudsman's recommenation unless within 21 days the Department or 
Minister or requester has lodged a notice of objection with the 
Official Information Tribunal. 
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9.7 It is interesting to note that the Australian Commonwealth 
statute, the Freedom of Information Act 1982, refers to two 
tribunals. There is the Document Review Tribunal established by 
Section 71. The principal jurisdiction to review decision 
however lies with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under Part 
IV of that Act. The statute does give an enlarged role to the 
Ombudsman but his role is still largely in mediation and 
conciliation. The intervention of the Ombudsman however leaves 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal free to deal principally with 
the more intractible cases which the Ombudsman could not get 
agreement on. 
9.8 It seems to me that there are real advantages to giving the final 
decision-making power to a tribunal rather than to a court. If 
the tribunal includes a judge as chairman, it will be able to 
give rulings on matters of law with some degree of authority. 
The tribunal, by its rulings, can give a degree of certainty in 
areas where this is needed, while still retaining a greater 
degree of flexibility in matters such as weighing-up the public 
interest [under Section 9(1)]. The traditional argument in 
favour of a tribunal, as opposed to a court, in areas such as 
this, is that it can be more flexible and less formal than a 
court. If the tribunal includes a member drawn from the 
executive branch of government, then there will be seen to be a 
sufficient input from the politicians, without the final control 
being seen to rest completely with the government as is the case 
with the Minister's veto. I would suggest a tribunal could deal 
with these matters more quickly and with less cost than a court. 
9.9 Whether the legislature finally adopts one of these three 
courses, or some other possibility remains to be seen. Whatever 
the outcome, it seems the Act will in future further change the 
nature of the Ombudsman or of the courts. The amended Act may 
bring the courts more into the political arena, or it may bring 
the Ombudsman more into the political arena (by maKing him the 
final decision maker) or it may downgrade the Ombudsman's role by 
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making him subject to a higher tribunal or appeal authority. The 
tenor of the Labour government thinking would seem to suggest 
that the courts rather than some other appellate body is 
considered most suitable to act as final decision maker. If that 
is the case then I would submit that careful thought needs to be 
given to the extent of the courts' authority. The normal rules 
for judicial review are simply not wide enough. The courts would 
need to reconsider the Ombudsman's recommendation on the merits 
of the case. The amending provisions would also need to make it 
clear to what extent the courts are expected to substitute their 
own views on matters such as the public interest, security and 
economic a ff airs. Given Mr Palmer's proposals for a Bill of 
Rights (also discussed during the recent election campaign) it 
seems that the courts will become involved to some extent in 
matters of policy in any event. From what has been said in this 
paper, it is, I think, clear that any such change will substan-
tially alter the role of the Ombudsman (in making him far more 
subject to judicial control) and will also bring our courts far 
more into issues of conflict in the public arena. That, however, 
is, I believe, preferable to completely reversing previous 
conceptions of the Ombudsman's role by making him the final 
arbiter on official information, subject only to the controls of 
judicial review. 
• • 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has, I believe, shown that so far in the operation of 
the Official Information Act there have been three discernable 
trends. First the authority of the Minister has been visibly 
reduced. Much has been made of the veto powers of the Minister 
and their apparent abuse. 1-bwever the fact remains that the 
Minister can only exercise his veto in accordance with the 
criteria contained in the Act and there are some judicial as well 
as political controls on the minister's actions. The flurry of 
vetos which . rose up last year appears to have died down. 
Certainly the new Labour government, having in opposition 
criticised the use of the ministerial veto, will feel constrained 
to make only the most sparing use of the veto power - if it 
resorts to the power at all. 
10.2 The second new trend I have mentioned is the change or expansion 
of the role of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is now involved in 
considering matters of law to a greater extent and to some extent 
has a more judicial role . 
One consequence may however be a greater likelihood that the 
Ombudsman will be subject to judicial review, which was not 
previously the case. One result of this may be for the Ombudsman 
to consider and reason his recommendations at greater length and 
with more reference being made to legal issues. 
10.3 The third trend is that the courts are likely to become more 
involved in these issues than previously. The Danks Committee 
saw convincing reasons for not making the courts the ultimate 
decision makers. 140 Whether the courts become involved by way 
of judicial review or otherwise, their influence seems to me 
inevitable. There are three reasons for believing this 
development likely:-
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(a) The control device represented by the ministerial 
veto appears to be likely to be used less often now. 
(b) The Ombudsman appears to be taking a determined 
stand and is recommending release of information 
even in quite arguable cases. 141 
(c) Some departments have not taken full cognisance of 
the changes achieved by the Act and are still 
attempting to withhold information wherever 
possible. 142 
Whether the role of the courts will become of major significance 
however depends on what amendments are made to the Act. 
10. 4 In any event these considerations, lead to the conclusion that 
the functions and duties of Ministers and of the Onbudsman have 
changed as a result of the Official Information Act and may be 
expected to go through further major changes in the near future. 
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